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Two Theories of Habeas Corpus 
Determining the appropriate role of habeas corpus in 
American law has taken on new import because of political 
pressures to detain terrorism suspects without charge.  These 
detainees, like those of prior generations, have sought due 
process through habeas corpus, predictably meeting with mixed 
success.1  Although the writ has often been described as the 
ultimate protector of liberty,2 judges have applied it 
inconsistently, to say the least.  Through the twentieth 
century, the federal courts have held that violating a detainee’s 
constitutional rights both does3 and does not4 justify granting 
the writ.  And the current standard rests uncomfortably in 
  
 1 Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding American 
citizen held as enemy combatant may challenge factual basis for detention on habeas), 
and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488 (2004) (holding federal courts have habeas 
jurisdiction to review confinement of non-Americans outside U.S. territory), with 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 450-51 (2004) (rejecting habeas challenge on 
jurisdictional grounds). 
 2 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963) (“[T]he historic conception of 
the writ, anchored in the ancient common law and in our Constitution as an efficacious 
and imperative remedy for detentions of fundamental illegality, has remained constant 
to the present day.”); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868) (“The great writ of 
habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of 
personal freedom.”); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (describing the 
object of the writ as the “liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient 
cause”); 1 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES: 
HABEAS CORPUS AND THE OTHER COMMON LAW WRITS § 1.00 (1987) (“It is everywhere 
accepted that both the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and its modern counterparts are to 
be construed broadly and generously to protect the liberty of the people.”); Milton 
Cantor, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: Early American Origins and Development, in 
FREEDOM AND REFORM 57 (Harold M. Hyman & Leonard W. Levy eds., 1967) (quoting 
Blackstone describing habeas corpus as “the great and efficacious writ in all manner of 
illegal confinement”); WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS 
CORPUS 9 (1980); Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas 
Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1087 (1995); Curtis R. Reitz, 
Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 
1344, 1349-51 (1961); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 25 (1956). 
 3 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (“[S]ince Brown v. Allen it has 
been the rule that the federal habeas petitioner who claims he is detained pursuant to 
a final judgment of a state court in violation of the United States Constitution is 
entitled to have the federal habeas court make its own independent determination of 
his federal claim, without being bound by the determination on the merits of that claim 
reached in the state proceedings.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 4 Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 447 (1925) (“[T]he judgment of state courts 
in criminal cases will not be reviewed on habeas corpus merely because some right 
under the Constitution of the United States is alleged to have been denied to the 
person convicted.”). 
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between.5  Most commentators would agree with Joseph 
Hoffman’s and William Stuntz’s conclusion that “habeas 
doctrine has achieved a Rube Goldberg quality that frustrates 
all efforts to give it logical coherence.”6 
This state of affairs is unacceptable.  Without a 
thorough understanding of the writ’s history, the courts are ill-
equipped to chart its future.  This article presents two theories 
of habeas corpus that help explain the doctrine’s changing 
course.  The first – the judicial-power theory – interprets the 
writ as a device that superior courts use to enforce their 
authority to proclaim the law when inferior judges defy or 
trivialize that power.7  According to this theory, habeas 
  
 5 The current position was in large part codified by the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.  With respect to the standard of review, the 
statute reads:  
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings 
unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) 
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2000).  The Supreme Court has interpreted this standard to 
require what it calls “objectively reasonable decisions,” a category of decisions with 
incoherent criteria.  See Steven Semeraro, A Reasoning-Process-Review Model for 
Federal Habeas Corpus, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 897, 923-27 (2004) (“The many 
divided decisions in recent habeas cases . . . confirm that whenever an issue is truly 
debatable, one cannot predict how the Court will decide.”).  For example, in a recent 
case, the Court split five to four granting the writ in an ineffective assistance of counsel 
case.  Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005). The majority found that the state 
courts had been objectively unreasonable, id. at 2467, yet the dissent believed that the 
state was not only reasonable but correct, declaring that “it is this Court, not the state 
court, which is unreasonable.” Id. at 2471 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 6 Joseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas Afer the Revolution, 1993 
SUP. CT. REV. 65, 109 (1994) (explaining that the Court has developed ever-evolving, 
complicated and arguably convoluted threshold requirements that petitioners must 
satisfy, which have nothing to do with the constitutionality of the conviction, before a 
federal habeas court can address the merits of a constitutional claim). 
 7 The Court has held that it has the ultimate power to articulate federal 
constitutional and statutory law. See Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 407 (1871); 
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 525 (1858). 
  Prior commentators have alluded to an inter-governmental regulatory role 
for habeas corpus that is in line with the theory put forth here.  See DUKER, supra note 
2, at 8, 33-48 (recognizing that habeas served as a device that allowed common law 
courts to protect their jurisdiction); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING 
THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 6 (2001) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus . . . implements the 
theme of checks and balances that pervades our Constitutional structure”); DANIEL J. 
MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA 12-13 (1966) (analogizing modern role of 
habeas in the United States to its former role in resolving rivalries among competing 
English courts); RONALD P. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 5, 22 (1969) (“The 
argument is that the writ is today being used in America to pull judicial business, 
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doctrine expands when necessary to combat the inferior courts’ 
systemic failure to track superior court changes in the scope of 
liberty-enhancing rights.  When the system stabilizes, the writ 
contracts and comes to be employed in an ad hoc fashion to root 
out clear examples of lower court defiance or trivialization of 
superior law.8 
The second habeas theory focuses on the ideology 
associated with the writ. Histories of habeas corpus, like most 
historical legal theory, generally interpret doctrinal change as 
a response to independent social and political factors external 
to the legal system.  This need-response hypothesis of doctrinal 
development is true at some level, but incomplete.  To fully 
understand the development of habeas doctrine, one must also 
take account of the extent to which that doctrine, and the 
ideology surrounding it, helped create changes in society, 
politics, and the law itself.   
This conflicting-ideologies theory explores these broader 
effects of habeas doctrine, contending that the writ in the 
United States has long embodied two competing ideologies.  
First, a powerful liberty-supporting ideology has enabled 
reformers to conceive of, and opponents to accept, new 
possibilities for expanding liberty-enhancing rights.  Second, a 
counter-habeas ideology sees the writ as a dangerous get-out-
of-jail-free card that enables criminals to avoid just 
punishments.  Ironically, this ideology too has advanced liberty 
interests by focusing opponents of broad criminal procedure 
  
formerly within the exclusive province of the state courts, into the federal, much as it 
was pulled eight centuries ago into the royal courts.”); Seymour D. Thompson, Abuses 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 18 AM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1884) (explaining that habeas was 
“[d]esigned as a means of subjecting to the superintendence of the superior courts and 
judges, arrests and imprisonments made by ministerial officers and by inferior 
magistrates . . . .”); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 
2338 (1993) [hereinafter Yackle, Hagioscope] (explaining that “the writ provided the 
means by which the federal courts came to have ultimate authority to vindicate federal 
claims arising in state criminal cases”);  Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 997 (1985) [hereinafter Yackle, Explaining] (“Properly 
conceived, the writ is not a procedural vehicle for the protection of physical 
liberty . . . but an instrument of governmental administration employed to distribute 
authority and responsibility between courts of concurrent jurisdiction.”).  Yet none of 
these commentators have pursued this theory as a primary rationale for changes in 
habeas doctrine. 
 8 One example of this expansion-contraction cycle occurred in the 1960s and 
1970s.  In the early 1960s, the United States Supreme Court applied a number of 
federal criminal procedure rights to the states.  Anticipating state court confusion or 
resistance, the Court simultaneously expanded the scope of habeas.  See infra Parts 
II.C.4-5.  Once federal rights became an accepted part of state criminal proceedings, 
the scope of the writ – but not the rights of detained persons – contracted.  See infra 
Part II.C.6. 
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protections on challenging the scope of the writ itself, rather 
than the substance of liberty-enhancing rights.  
Part I of this article briefly describes the development of 
habeas corpus doctrine and surveys the existing developmental 
theories.  Although the stories are quite varied, each rests on 
the notion that habeas has a true form against which 
particular judicial decisions can be measured.  The differing 
accounts all agree that the Court has sometimes interpreted 
habeas incorrectly, though they cannot agree about which 
decisions were mistakes.  
Part II presents the judicial-power theory.  According to 
this interpretation, when the judges of a superior court system 
are confident that inferior courts are attempting to apply the 
law in good faith, the merits of the incarceration of a particular 
individual may receive little, if any, scrutiny.9  By contrast, 
when the superior court senses that its legal proclamations are 
being ignored or trivialized, it is likely to intervene through 
habeas review regardless of the strength of the liberty interest 
at stake.10  After briefly summarizing the consistency between 
this interpretation of the writ and its common law and 
nineteenth century American uses, this Part explores each of 
the significant developments in habeas doctrine throughout the 
twentieth century and explains how each is consistent with the 
judicial-power understanding of the writ. 
Part III presents the conflicting-ideologies theory of 
habeas corpus in which doctrinal change is explained by the 
oscillating dominance of a liberty-centered ideology and a 
crime-control ideology.  At each step, this theory explains, 
habeas doctrine did not simply respond to changing attitudes 
about criminal procedure; it helped enable those attitudes to 
change.  This part gathers historical anecdotes in political and 
legal commentary that exemplify the conflicting ideological 
roles that habeas has played over time.  It concludes, perhaps 
surprisingly, that changes in habeas corpus have advanced the 
  
 9 See, e.g., O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156, 167-68 (1997) (refusing 
to review constitutionality of failing to instruct jury that the alternative to a death 
sentence was life without possibility of parole because case became final before federal 
constitutional compulsion to make such information available to the jury was 
announced); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1986) (refusing to review 
constitutional claim virtually indistinguishable from claim previously granted because 
petitioner did not raise issue on state appeal, though an amicus had raised it). 
 10 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986) (extending writ to 
grand jury error bearing no relation to the liberty interest of the defendant); Tom Stacy 
& Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 99-
101 (1988) (explaining that grand jury claim is unrelated to propriety of conviction). 
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interests of liberty irrespective of which ideological pole has 
dominated. 
I. EXISTING THEORIES OF HABEAS CORPUS’S DOCTRINAL 
EVOLUTION 
This section briefly explains habeas corpus doctrine 
under the common law and federal and state constitutions, 
statutes, and court decisions.  It then summarizes the existing 
academic theories of doctrinal change. 
A. Origins and Early Codification 
At common law, and later by statute in England, the 
writ of habeas corpus was used to challenge arbitrary 
imprisonment without charge,11 and at least occasionally 
improper confinement as well.12  The colonists brought the writ 
to the New World,13 and the founding fathers explicitly 
recognized it in the Suspension Clause of Article I of the 
Federal Constitution.14  Section 14 of The Judiciary Act of 1789 
created authority in the federal courts to grant the writ to 
prisoners held in federal custody “for the purpose of an inquiry 
into the cause of commitment.”15  Neither the constitutional 
provision, which simply prohibits the suspension of the writ, 
nor the awkward language of the first habeas statute did much 
to project the course of habeas doctrine.16 
  
 11 Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States 1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 
243, 244-45 (1965) (“At common law and under the famous Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 
the use of the great Writ against official restraints was simply to ensure that a person 
was not held without formal charges and that once charged he was either bailed or 
brought to trial within a specified time.”).  See generally ROBERT S. WALKER, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF 
LIBERTY (1960); 9 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 111 (4th ed. 1926). 
 12 The most famous example is Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006-07 
(C.P.), in which a court granted the writ in favor of jurors confined for failing to convict. 
 13 DUKER, supra note 2, at 95-116. 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 reads: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.” 
 15 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789). 
 16 Interpretations of the clause range from merely limiting the ability of the 
federal government to suspend the writ in the state courts, DUKER, supra note 2, at 135 
(“In sum, the debates in the federal and state conventions, the location of the habeas 
clause, and the contemporary commentary support the thesis that the habeas clause 
was designed to restrict Congressional power to suspend state habeas for federal 
prisoners.”), to creating a federal constitutional right to federal court review of state 
court convictions. FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 46 (“Since the Constitution came into 
force, the federal courts have had the authority to free state prisoners on habeas 
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In 1867, Congress adopted the language that remains in 
force today: “[T]he several courts of the United States . . . shall 
have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where 
any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation 
of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United 
States.”17  Despite the apparent clarity and broad scope of the 
1867 language,18 commentators have vigorously debated 
Congress’s intent.  Some have narrowly interpreted the 1867 
Act to have extended only then-existing habeas power to freed 
slaves who had been effectively bound to continued servitude.19  
Others have argued that the Act created a federal forum to 
review all questions of federal law that arise in state criminal 
cases.20   
  
corpus, and the Suspension Clause applies as a matter of original intent to any attempt 
by Congress to limit that authority.”).  Other theories have also been advanced.  See, 
e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., HOW HUMAN RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION 51-74 
(1952).   
 17 Law of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867). 
 18 A sponsor of the Act declared that it created habeas jurisdiction in the 
federal courts “coextensive with all the powers that can be conferred upon them.”  
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence). 
 19 See DUKER, supra note 2, at 242 (“[T]here was no hint that the measure 
was intended to apply to those convicted by a state court of competent jurisdiction”); 
Forsythe, supra note 2, at 1116 (“[T]here is a strong and consistent record that can be 
read to understand the 1867 Act as referring to the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
Reconstruction laws designed to enforce it.  Indeed, the purpose of protecting the 
freedmen seems to dominate the entire course of the bill . . . . [A]side from the class of 
persons protected, there is nothing in the legislative history that alters the conclusion 
from the text that the Act did not change the English limitations except in the mode of 
factual inquiry.”); Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court 
as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 55-56 (1965) (“[T]here is no foundation for 
the Court’s assertions that the 1867 act was intended to afford a new remedy for state 
prisoners, that it was enacted in contemplation of anticipated southern resistance to 
Reconstruction, and that it was aimed at implementing the fourteenth amendment.”); 
Neil McFeeley, Habeas Corpus and Due Process: From Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 533, 535 (1976) (“Historical research indicates that the [1867 Act was] instituted 
to protect the newly-freed slaves against the vagrant and apprentice laws formulated 
by the southern states.”). 
 20 Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1868) (“This legislation is 
of the most comprehensive character.  It brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of 
every court and of every judge every possible case of deprivation of liberty contrary to 
the National Constitution, treaties, or laws.  It is impossible to widen this 
jurisdiction.”); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 619-20 (1982) (concluding that the 1867 Act indicated that 
Congress believed state courts would not “vindicate federal law” and it thus conferred 
full authority to federal courts to adjudicate federal claims anew); Mark Tushnet, 
Judicial Revision of the Habeas Corpus Statutes: A Note on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
1975 WIS. L. REV. 484, 487-92 (arguing that legislative history of the 1867 Act supports 
broad view). 
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Subsequent legislation21 did little to settle that dispute 
until the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (“AEDPA”),22 in which Congress explicitly imposed a 
standard of review on federal habeas courts reviewing state 
criminal proceedings.  In place of the existing judicially created 
de novo review standard,23 the amendment required a federal 
habeas court to defer to the state court unless that decision was 
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States.”24  
In interpreting these statutes, the Court has tended to 
chart its own course.  While generally assuming that the 1867 
Act granted the broadest possible jurisdiction, the Court has 
often refrained from exercising that jurisdiction for prudential 
reasons.25  Even under the relatively clear language in AEDPA, 
the Justices have continued to engage in definitional debate26 
  
 21 A 1948 amendment codified the judge-made exhaustion of state remedies 
requirement.  Act of June 25, 1948, § 2254, 62 Stat. 967.  The 1966 amendments 
limited the federal habeas courts’ discretion to hold evidentiary hearings where state 
courts had made fact findings.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)-(c) (2000).  See S.REP. NO. 89-1797, 
at 2 (1966), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3663, 3663-64; see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1892, 
at 5-7 (1966). 
 22 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. 
Lanham No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 
18, 19, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 23 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). 
 24 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2000). 
 25 In 1886, the Court recognized federal jurisdiction to remove state criminal 
cases to federal court, but required prisoners ordinarily to exhaust state court remedies 
first.  Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).  The Court subsequently took the same 
approach with respect to procedural defaults of federal claims, Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 
87 (1977) (recognizing federal jurisdiction despite state law procedural bar to review, 
but requiring federal courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction unless petitioner 
demonstrates cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from the lack of 
federal review); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 425-27, 433 (1963) (recognizing federal 
jurisdiction despite state law procedural bar to review, but permitting federal courts to 
refrain from exercising jurisdiction where petitioner deliberately bypassed state 
proceeding in order to secure federal court review); non-constitutional claims, United 
States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-85 (1979) (reserving judgment on jurisdiction 
and refusing to address non-constitutional violation of a federal rule of criminal 
procedure); and Fourth Amendment claims, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 
(1976) (recognizing federal jurisdiction but refusing to hear Fourth Amendment claim 
on habeas unless petitioner was not granted a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
claim in state court). 
 26 In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Court split five to four on 
what this language meant.  The majority held the new amendment limited the federal 
courts’ authority to grant the writ to cases in which state courts “unreasonably appl[y]” 
federal law in an objective sense to be determined by the federal courts according “to 
the facts of the prisoner’s case.”  Id. at 413.  The four Justices in the minority concluded 
that the 1996 Amendment required federal courts to “give state courts’ opinions a 
respectful reading, and to listen carefully to their conclusions, but when the state court 
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and the writ continues to be applied quite flexibly.27  These 
decisions are entirely untethered to the common law, 
constitutional, or statutory bases for the writ.28  In short, the 
Court’s approach has been to do what it thinks is right.29 
The result has been an accordion-like habeas doctrine 
that appears to expand and contract with the mood of the 
Justices.30  Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, 
the Court insisted that habeas claims would lie only where 
either (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction, or (2) the statute 
under which a conviction or sentence rested was 
  
addresses a legal question, it is the law ‘as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ that prevails.’” Id. at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lindh v. 
Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 27 In each of the following ten cases addressing habeas challenges after full 
briefing, a sharply divided Court granted the writ five times and denied it five times.  
Compare Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2469 (2005) (granting the writ); Miller-El 
v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2340 (2005) (same), Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 529 
(2003) (same), Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04 (2001) (same), and Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 442-44 (2000) (same), with Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 
655 (2004) (denying the writ), Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-77 (2002) (same), 
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 688-89 (2002) (same), Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 
165 (2000) (same), and Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 227 (2000) (same).  The Court 
has also indicated that despite the more restrictive language of the 1996 Act, it may 
retain prudential restraints on federal court jurisdiction even if the statute’s 
requirements are satisfied.  See Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (suggesting 
the Court will continue to apply its retroactivity doctrine even to cases in which 
AEDPA standard would permit a federal court to grant the writ, stating “none of our 
post-AEDPA cases have suggested that a writ of habeas corpus should automatically 
issue if a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA standard . . . .”). 
 28 For example, the Court does exercise its jurisdiction in cases that are quite 
difficult to distinguish from Stone.  428 U.S. 465 (1976).  See Withrow v. Williams, 507 
U.S. 680, 694-96 (1993) (exercising habeas jurisdiction over Miranda claim); Rose v. 
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 564-65 (1979) (exercising habeas jurisdiction over equal 
protection claim of racial discrimination in selecting a state grand-jury foreman). 
 29 Jordan Steiker has shown that changes in statutory law have done little to 
guide the courts.  Instead, much of the development of habeas law has taken the form 
of federal common law rather than statutory interpretation.  Although he supports that 
conclusion well, and uses it to argue effectively that the Court could thus decide to 
reach pure innocence claims on habeas, he offers no theory to explain the evolution of 
the common law of habeas that he identifies.  Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal 
Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 310-11 (1993). 
 30 Numerous commentators have thoroughly mined the federal courts’ 
apparently conflicting nineteenth century decisions.  See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality 
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 
465-77 (1963) (reading early cases to permit habeas review only where trial court 
lacked jurisdiction); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic 
Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2057-81 
(1992) (reading early cases limiting habeas review as hinging on the right to direct 
review in U.S. Supreme Court); Peller, supra note 20, at 603-43 (reading early cases to 
permit broad review on habeas). See generally Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993) (reading early cases limiting habeas review as hinging on 
the existence of now defunct common law remedies for illegal official conduct). 
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unconstitutional.31  Yet, the Court also granted the writ in 
cases where jurisdiction and valid statutory authority were 
present.32 
In the early 1950s, the Court held that the writ reached 
all violations of the Federal Constitution,33 and in the 1960s, 
the Court even acted like it meant what it said.34  While aspects 
of the writ contracted in the 1970s, the courts continued to use 
it liberally to overturn death sentences.35  Although the Court’s 
decisions in the late 1980s and 1990s – and the amendment of 
the statute in 1996 – projected an era of significant narrowing 
of the habeas statute, the Court itself has continued to employ 
the writ, in some ways more aggressively than it had in recent 
decades.36 
B. Theories of Habeas’s Doctrinal Change 
Theories abound seeking to explain the changes in 
habeas doctrine over time.37  Though they vary widely, what 
  
 31 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944); Ashe v. United States ex rel. 
Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1926); Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 445 (1925); DUKER, 
supra note 2, at 244-48.  Despite the language of the cases, some have read them as 
constitutional decisions rather than habeas decisions.  Justice O’Connor summarized 
this interpretation of the history of the writ in her concurring opinion in Wright v. 
West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992):  
While it is true that a state prisoner could not obtain the writ if he had been 
provided a full and fair hearing in the state courts [through the first half of 
the twentieth century], this rule governed the merits of a claim under the 
Due Process Clause.  It was not a threshold bar to the consideration of other 
federal claims, because, with rare exceptions, there were no other federal 
claims available at the time. 
Id. at 297-98 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 32 See, e.g., Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286-87 (1941) (extending the 
writ to claim that uncounseled guilty plea violated due process); Moore v. Dempsey, 
261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923) (extending the writ to a claim the jury was improperly 
influenced by a mob). 
 33 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953) (holding that a state court 
decision was not res judicata). 
 34 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 391-99, 426-27 (1963) (granting writ in twenty-
one-year-old case in which defendant had failed to appeal the denial of a motion to 
suppress his confession and explaining that the Court had “consistently held that 
federal court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint 
and is not defeated by anything that may occur in the state court proceedings. State 
procedural rules plainly must yield to this overriding federal policy.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 35 Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 365-66 (1988); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 
481 U.S. 393, 397-99 (1987). 
 36 See infra Part II.C.8. 
 37 Forsythe, supra note 2, at 1124-63 (discussing the Supreme Court’s habeas 
cases and other leading commentary). 
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unifies them all – and distinguishes them from the two theories 
offered here – is the vision of a single true writ of  habeas 
corpus.  In moments of clarity, these commentators suggest, 
the Court has comprehended that truth.  But then, the Justices 
have wallowed in ignorance, applying the writ in an utterly 
incorrect way.38 
The roots of modern habeas theory date back to Paul 
Bator’s 1963 article, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal 
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,39 and Judge Friendly’s 1970 
reprise, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments,40 both of which advance the historical premise that 
habeas corpus as originally understood could not be used to 
review a conviction by a court with subject matter 
jurisdiction.41  The Court’s decisions broadening the writ, these 
commentators thought, had lost touch with the true habeas.   
The numerous subsequent theories are by and large 
response briefs to Bator’s thesis – as supplemented by Friendly 
  
 38 Wholly apart from the merits of the arguments, there are at least two 
reasons to seriously doubt explanations of habeas doctrine that rely on these theories of 
mistake.  First, when the Court has rejected a body of doctrine as a mistake, it has said 
so.  For example, when the Court rejected its Lochner era jurisprudence, it did so 
explicitly.  Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“The doctrine that prevailed 
in Lochner [and its progeny] – that due process authorizes courts to hold laws 
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely – has long since 
been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts 
do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative 
bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”).  The Court’s own references to habeas doctrinal 
change have borne the ring of evolution rather than mistake correction.   
  Second, stark divergence between doctrine and theory can often be 
explained by conflicting understandings about the nature and purpose of the law.  As 
Bruce Ackerman described this phenomenon, theorists tend to assume “that the judges 
have been strikingly inept” when in fact the courts may understand the law “in a way 
that is strikingly different” from the theorists.  BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 24-25 (1977).  In the case of habeas, theorists may 
have been overly focused on liberty interests while courts employed the writ to protect 
their own power.  See infra Part II. 
 39 Bator, supra note 30. 
 40 Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970). 
 41 Bator and Friendly were not the first to advance this argument.  Seymour 
Thompson propounded many of the same concerns nearly 80 years earlier in response 
to the first expansion of federal habeas beyond pure jurisdictional questions.  See 
Thompson, supra note 7, at 17-18 n.1 (collecting cases as of 1884 in which habeas 
corpus had been limited in the context of challenging convictions to cases in which the 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction); id. at 16 (“[I]t is not at all clear that it was 
intended that [habeas corpus] should become a means in the hands of the [F]ederal 
district and circuit judges of revising and reversing the judgments of the courts of the 
States without regard to their rank or dignity.”); id. at 19 (emphasizing that state 
judges have an obligation to follow federal law that “is just as strong as the same 
obligation when resting upon the shoulders of a judge of a Federal court”); id. at 21 
(“[T]he interior Federal courts have unlocked the penitentiaries of the States . . . .”). 
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– that the Warren Court dramatically and without justification 
expanded federal habeas review.  While some commentators 
present sound arguments and lay bare serious errors in Bator’s 
historical analysis, they too are unable to account for the 
development of habeas over the course of the twentieth 
century.  Either the Court lost its way in the twenty years from 
roughly 1953 through 1973 when habeas review was quite 
broad, or it subsequently lost its way in refusing to reach the 
merits of many habeas petitions alleging non-harmless 
constitutional violations.  The two bodies of doctrine, for these 
commentators, are irreconcilable.42 
Over the past twenty years, some commentators have 
attempted to articulate theories of habeas that do not accuse 
the Court of reaching wholly erroneous decisions during one 
era or another.  Much of this literature is extremely 
enlightening.43  But none of it succeeds in presenting a theory 
that reconciles the broad habeas regime that existed in the 
1960s and the narrower one in place today.  Although some 
commentators lay claim to a unified theory of habeas that 
explains both historic and modern doctrine, each is ultimately 
  
 42 See, e.g., Peller, supra note 20, at 586-92 (arguing that Bator and Friendly 
are wrong in criticizing the Court’s extensive use of habeas in the mid-twentieth 
century but offering no explanation for the subsequent narrowing of the writ). 
 43 James Liebman has explained the initial expansion of federal habeas as a 
natural outgrowth of two independent developments in federal law: (1) the federal 
courts’ evolving level of scrutiny of questions of fact and the application of particular 
facts to established legal standards, or so-called mixed questions of fact and law, and 
(2) changes in the United States Supreme Court’s own jurisdiction to review state law 
convictions.  He explained that what appeared to be narrow habeas review in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a function of the limited grounds for 
review combined with a right to appellate review in the Supreme Court.  Habeas 
appeared to expand when new grounds for review were created, because the caseload 
made mandatory Supreme Court review impossible.  Liebman, supra note 30, at 2058, 
2072, 2075-81, 2091-92. See also Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. 
REV. 247, 274-75 (1988) (making the same points as Leibman with somewhat less 
historical documentation, along with a third point that certiorari petitions were often 
incomprehensible during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, further 
justifying habeas review). 
  Ann Woolhandler has argued that (1) the expansion of habeas was part of 
the federal courts’ recognition that ad hoc individual action could violate the 
Constitution, and (2) the subsequent narrowing of the writ is part of a mistaken trend 
toward limiting remedies for these ad hoc violations.  Woolhandler, supra note 30, at 
630-32. 
  Larry Yackle argues that litigants have a right to have federal issues 
decided in federal court, but that the compelling benefits of diverse centers of criminal-
law making in the various states justify exhaustion of state court remedies.  Yackle, 
Explaining, supra note 7, at 1032-40.  He thus concludes that the Court struck the 
right balance in the 1950s and 1960s by (1) requiring that state criminal litigation 
occur initially in state court, and (2) permitting convicts to re-litigate federal issues 
collaterally through the federal habeas process.  Id. 
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critical of core aspects of modern doctrine that do not fit the 
theory.44 
Two approaches are emblematic of the standard 
thinking about the development of habeas doctrine.  First, Ann 
Woolhandler and Larry Yackle have argued that the modern 
contraction in habeas law is an outgrowth of the post-Warren 
Court’s ambivalence about, if not outright opposition to, 
protecting individual rights, particularly from ad hoc violation 
  
 44 For example, Liebman attempts to fit modern law within his normative 
vision, contending that habeas is, has always been, and should continue to be a 
practical substitute for direct appellate review of state criminal cases in the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Liebman, supra note 30, at 2056 (claiming to make “an effort to show 
how most or all the Court’s cases map onto this rule”). Case law existing when his 
article was published, however, was inconsistent with his theory.  For example, 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Court aggressively reviewed on direct appeal 
state court decisions on Fourth Amendment issues. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 36 (2000); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 115-16 (1998); Hayes 
v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 812-13 (1985); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 87, 90 (1979).  
Yet, the Court permitted virtually no federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment 
questions. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).  In addition, Liebman says 
that the Court’s procedural bar jurisprudence on habeas was consistent with the 
Court’s direct review jurisdiction. Liebman, supra note 30, at 2095 (arguing that the 
cause and prejudice test “provides a nearly perfect proxy for the ‘adequate and 
independent state grounds’ doctrine on direct appeal”).  Federal habeas courts, 
however, retain an ad hoc power to address serious miscarriages of justice despite the 
adequacy of a state ground for denying a constitutional claim.  Murray v. Carrier, 477 
U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (“[W]here a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ 
even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”).  Doing justice 
cannot overcome the Court’s lack of jurisdiction on direct appeal.  See Murdock v. City 
of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1875) (explaining the ordinarily limited 
nature of federal jurisdiction to review state court decisions). Most importantly, the 
enactment of AEDPA, and the Court’s subsequent interpretation of it, have clearly 
established separate standards for direct and habeas review.  Although the U.S. 
Supreme Court can review direct challenges to state criminal convictions de novo, a 
federal habeas court may reach the merits only if the state court unreasonably applied 
federal law.  For further discussion of AEDPA, see supra note 5. 
  Larry Yackle also claims to explain modern doctrine, but he too disagrees 
with several aspects of it. See Yackle, Explaining, supra note 7, at 1051 (explaining 
how his analysis supports a more flexible exhaustion doctrine than current doctrine 
requires); id. at 1052-54 (describing deference to state fact finding in modern doctrine 
as inconsistent with his approach); id. at 1058 (“If my alternative explanation for 
habeas were adopted, the federal habeas courts might well disregard procedural 
default in state court altogether and entertain federal claims even when petitioners 
‘deliberately bypassed’ state procedures.”). 
  Barry Friedman’s claim that his proposal “describes the emerging trend of 
Court decisions with some accuracy,” Friedman, supra note 43, at 329, also turns out to 
be overstated.  He ultimately argues that his theory supports significant changes to 
existing law.  See id. at 287 (concluding that the appellate model of habeas “suggests 
that Stone simply is incorrectly decided”); id. at 298-99, 324-25, 340-46 (articulating a 
significant change in the law with respect to procedural bar); id. at 319 (arguing that 
the total exhaustion rule should be overruled); id. at 328 (arguing for significant 
changes to the test for ineffective assistance of counsel); id. at 337 (suggesting change 
in exhaustion rules to require prisoners to seek habeas review before seeking review in 
the U.S. Supreme Court). 
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by individual government actors.45  However true that 
description may be with respect to the personal views of 
particular Justices, one cannot readily ascribe it to a Court that 
has continued to expand criminal procedure rights46 and ad hoc 
constitutional review of them,47 while it has constricted habeas.   
Second, Evan Tsen Lee emphasizes that modern habeas 
doctrine rests in large part on the belief that the writ deters 
  
 45 Woolhandler, supra note 30, at 635 (“More recently . . . the Court has 
returned to its prior ambivalence about the status of some constitutional rights – 
particularly rights to be free from ad hoc official illegality.  This ambivalence has 
translated into dilution of remedies available in federal courts, including relief on 
habeas.”); Larry W. Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 7, at 2331 (1993) (“The battle over 
habeas is driven, in the main, . . . by an ideological resistance to the Warren Court’s 
innovative interpretations of substantive federal rights.”). 
 46 The entire body of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, which imposed 
vast new obligations on the states, was developed after the initial restraints on habeas.  
See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1980) (applying principle of guided 
discretion to vague factor used to determine eligibility for the death sentence); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (adopting the constitutional guided-
discretion principle for cruel and unusual punishment claims challenging death 
sentences).  In addition, long after it had virtually eliminated federal habeas review of 
search and seizure claims, the Court continued to expand the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.  See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding that 
stopping of automobiles without cause to prevent drug trafficking violates the Fourth 
Amendment); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) (holding that detention 
without cause for fingerprinting violates the Fourth Amendment); Ybarra v. Illinois, 
444 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1979) (holding that warrant to search tavern and bartender did not 
give police authority to frisk patrons without cause).  Similarly, after substantial 
narrowing of habeas review in general, the Court continued to expand other rights 
under (1) the Fifth Amendment, see, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 
(1990) (extending right to counsel during custodial interrogation); Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1981) (adopting per se rule that police may not initiate 
questioning of a defendant who invokes Miranda rights); (2) the Sixth Amendment, see, 
e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (holding that request for counsel at 
a hearing must extend to subsequent interrogation); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 
176-77 (1985) (holding right to counsel violated by using uncover agent to question 
suspect who had been indicted for crimes relating to the communications); Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1977) (interpreting right to counsel to require 
exclusion of statement made outside the presence of counsel that was not a product of 
interrogation), and (3) general due process protections, see, e.g., Simmons v. South 
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (requiring that the jury be instructed that the alternative 
to a death sentence is life without possibility of parole where the state introduces 
evidence of future dangerousness as an aggravating factor). 
 47 For example, in the twenty years since United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 920 (1984), created the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court has 
applied it only to searches authorized by an entity other than the police themselves.  
See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1995) (explaining that the Leon exception to 
the exclusionary rule applies where the error is not attributable to a “law enforcement 
team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”); id. at 16-17 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that if error were attributable to an 
unreasonable police decision, the Leon exception to the exclusionary rule would not 
apply). 
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state actors from violating constitutional rights.48  Lee’s focus 
on deterrence captures the flavor of the analysis that the Court 
has ostensibly undertaken in modern habeas cases – balancing 
the deterrent value of granting the writ against its cost in 
terms of finality and comity.  For example, the federal courts 
generally will not entertain constitutional claims that were not 
raised in state court.  The cost in terms of retrial or release of a 
potentially guilty defendant is deemed high, while the need for 
deterrence where no objection is lodged is quite low.  But if the 
defendant demonstrates cause attributable to the state – 
conduct that would likely be deterred in the future if the writ 
were granted – and prejudice to the defendant’s case, then a 
federal habeas court will address the claim.   
As an interpretive device, a deterrence/finality/comity 
theory leads to nowhere.  Granting the writ could always, in 
theory, deter state court action inconsistent with federal 
standards, yet granting the writ always undermines finality 
and federal-state comity.49  The inability to quantify any of the 
variables enables this rationale to justify every past decision, 
but to predict no future ones.   
Moreover, the premises that (1) broad habeas deters 
state court decisions inconsistent with federal law and (2) 
modern restrictive habeas review shows more respect for 
finality and state processes may be wrong as well.  Elected 
state judges may be more likely to deny constitutional 
challenges if they know that life-tenured federal judges are 
waiting to clean up the mess.50  And current doctrine’s near 
absolute deference to state fact finding and default rules, 
combined with continuing scrutiny of substantive 
  
 48 Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 
151, 219 (1994) (“The deterrence theory is the best interpretation of the text, history, 
and structure of the present federal habeas statute and ought to be augmented by 
notions of process and innocence.”). Other commentators and members of the Court 
have also identified deterrence as a role played by habeas doctrine.  See Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he threat of habeas [corpus] 
serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the 
land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established 
constitutional standards.” (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-263 
(Harlan, J., concurring))); Liebman, supra note 30, at 2032 (“Habeas corpus is designed 
to deter state courts from misapplying federal law in effect at the time the state courts 
acted.”); Peller, supra note 20, at 668. 
 49 Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 109 (“[C]omity and federalism always 
offer an argument for further restricting habeas.”). 
 50 See Steven Semeraro, Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 79, 97-98 nn.50-56 (2002) (citing psychological evidence tending to show that 
those who know someone else has ultimate responsibility for a decision will minimize 
negative outcomes and take the decision less seriously). 
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constitutional decisions, suggests that state judges, although 
capable of handling mundane matters of compiling a record 
and enforcing procedural rules, cannot be trusted to enforce 
individual constitutional rights.  The deterrence/finality/comity 
theory is thus at best indeterminate and possibly wholly 
misguided.51 
II. EXPLAINING CHANGE IN HABEAS DOCTRINE THROUGH 
THE JUDICIAL-POWER THEORY 
This Part advances the theory that courts use the writ 
to enforce their power rather than to remedy individual 
deprivations of liberty.  After a brief review of the common law 
writ and the early American experience, each significant 
development of habeas doctrine in the United States during the 
twentieth century will be explored through the prism of this 
judicial-power theory.  Beginning with Frank v. Magnum,52 and 
continuing through the modern cases limiting the scope of the 
writ, this Part shows how interpreting habeas corpus as an 
instrument of judicial power helps explain not only the cases 
expanding the writ, but also those cases restricting its scope 
from the guilty plea trilogy in 197053 through the Court’s 1993 
decision in Brecht v. Abrahamson54 and the 1996 habeas reform 
act.55  This Part identifies a neglected consideration that brings 
a measure of coherence to otherwise inexplicable doctrinal 
changes.  The judicial-power theory does not, however, provide 
a unique cause-and-effect explanation for each doctrinal 
development.  As Part III shows, other interpretations also 
enrich our understanding of habeas’s evolution.  
A. Common Law Use 
William Duker’s “A Constitutional History of Habeas 
Corpus” carefully examined inconsistencies between the 
  
 51 Even putting these problems aside, the deterrence/finality/comity theory, 
as Lee demonstrates, cannot explain key modern decisions limiting habeas review.  See 
Lee, supra note 48, at 220. 
 52 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 
 53 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797-98 (1970); McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).   
 54 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
 55 See infra Part II.C. 
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individual liberty theory of habeas and early habeas practice.56  
He showed that by the Fourteenth Century, English courts 
were entertaining petitions seeking release from unlawful 
detention.  But this practice, he wrote, “was largely 
attributable to the superior courts’ desire to extend and secure 
their jurisdiction” rather than a perceived right to individual 
review to safeguard personal liberty.57  “Release [under the 
writ],” he believed, “had nothing to do with the guilt or 
innocence of the party confined.”58   
In a number of recorded cases during the common law 
period, the courts simply refused to scrutinize even apparently 
serious claims of unlawful detention when the detention order 
came from a trusted source.59  Duker thus described the then-
accepted notion that “habeas corpus developed primarily to 
protect the liberty of the subject” as a “myth.”60  Although he 
did not see it this way, the individual liberty explanation was a 
myth because it explained only those cases in which the courts 
exercised their habeas authority.  Those cases in which they 
did not, despite apparently wrongful detentions, could only be 
explained as erroneous decisions.  The judicial-power theory, by 
contrast, explains the cases in which the English courts refused 
to grant the writ as well as those in which they did. 
B. Early U.S. Experience 
During this era, Congress expanded federal habeas 
jurisdiction three times.  Each responded to specific state court 
intrusions on federal authority.61  Two pre-1850 amendments 
  
 56 Initially, the writ was used to compel a party’s presence for trial or some 
other purpose rather than to test the legality of confinement.  DUKER, supra note 2, at 
23, 27; SOKOL, supra note 7, at 4. 
 57 DUKER, supra note 2, at 8, 26-48 (discussing various jurisdictional battles 
among English courts and other branches of government in which habeas corpus 
played an important role); SOKOL, supra note 7, at 4-5, 7-8 (explaining that in the 
Sixteenth Century the writ “became a weapon in . . . inter-court competition”). 
 58 DUKER, supra note 2, at 62. 
 59 See Regina v. Paty, (1704) 91 Eng. Rep. 431 (K.B.); Proceedings in the 
King’s-Bench, upon the Earl of Danby’s Motion for Bail, (1682) 11 St. Tr. 831, 853-54 
(K.B.) (refusing to examine cause of confinement where defendant held by Parliament); 
Five Knights Case, (1627) 3 St. Tr. 1, 59 (K.B.) (refusing to examine cause of 
confinement where defendants held directly by order of the King); DUKER, supra note 
2, at 29-60. 
 60 DUKER, supra note 2, at 8.  Although Duker reads the early history of 
habeas in a way that is consistent with this Article, he believes that the writ later 
transformed into a doctrine that focuses directly on preserving individual liberty.  Id. 
 61 See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a 
Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
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extended federal authority to state prisoners confined for 
fulfilling their obligations to either (1) the federal government 
or (2) a foreign government.62  Expanding federal habeas to 
those imprisoned for performing federal duties directly 
reinforced the supremacy of federal law-making authority.  
And permitting foreign citizens to petition for federal habeas 
review reinforced the supremacy of federal authority to deal 
with foreign nations.   
The third expansion occurred in the immediate 
aftermath of the Civil War in an amendment to the habeas 
statute creating federal jurisdiction “where any person may be 
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the 
constitution.”63 At first blush, this post-Civil-War amendment 
appears to have been motivated by an intent to protect 
individual liberty by extending federal habeas review to all 
state prisoners.64  Congress’s desire to enforce federal authority 
to abolish slave-holding, however, may have had as much to do 
with this expansion of the writ as the liberty of particular 
former slaves.  
C. Twentieth Century Developments in Habeas Doctrine 
This section explores each significant doctrinal 
development in modern habeas law.  Where prior histories 
have interpreted many of these changes as mistakes 
inconsistent with the true habeas, the judicial-power 
understanding of the writ coherently explains each of them.  In 
the early years of the century, the writ was employed in an ad 
  
862, 869, 882-83 (1994) (“The statutory expansions of the writ between 1789 and 1867 
were all aimed at specific challenges to federal supremacy.”); Thompson, supra note 7, 
at 14-16 (explaining contemporary events driving each amendment). 
 62 In 1833, Congress extended the scope of federal habeas to cases in which a 
prisoner was held by a state tribunal as a result of conduct undertaken in the service of 
the federal government.  Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634-35 (1833) 
(extending power of federal courts to grant the writ in favor of a prisoner “committed or 
confined on, or by any authority or law, for any act done, or omitted to be done, in 
pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree, of any judge 
or court thereof”).  In 1842, the power was further extended to prisoners who were 
“subjects or citizens of a foreign State” held under federal or state law for acts 
protected by the law of a foreign state and principles of international law.  Act of Aug. 
29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1842) (extending the power of the federal courts to grant 
the writ in favor of a prisoner held “on account of any act done or omitted under any 
alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exception, set up or claimed 
under the commission, or order, or sanction, of any foreign State or Sovereignty, the 
validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations, or under color thereof”). 
 63 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867). 
 64 Id. 
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hoc fashion to curtail what the Court saw as lower court 
insensitivity to serious abuses of due process.65  In mid-century, 
the writ was applied more systematically in response to the 
state courts’ confusion about, if not open hostility to, the 
selective incorporation of much of the criminal procedure 
elements of the Bill of Rights.66  By the 1970s, incorporation 
had become mainstream, and the justification for the 
systematic application of the writ waned.  During this period, 
the Court began to limit habeas review in ways that are 
consistent with the judicial-power theory.67   
Simultaneously with the narrowing of the writ in the 
1970s, the Court articulated a new body of substantive 
constitutional law governing death penalty cases.68  Like the 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights a generation earlier, this new 
doctrine engendered confusion and resistance in the state 
courts.  The Court’s restraints on habeas were thus 
strategically placed to limit habeas review of then well-
accepted doctrines, but not – or at least not so much – the 
Court’s new death penalty law.69  By the mid-1990s, 
constitutional death penalty doctrine had established itself on 
firmer ground, and the Court extended restraints on habeas 
more systematically.70  With Congress’s help in 1996, the Court 
again came to apply the writ in an ad hoc fashion to curtail 
inferior court defiance of Supreme Court precedent.71 
  
 65 See infra Parts II.C.1-2. 
 66 See infra Parts II.C.2-5. 
 67 See infra Part II.C.6. 
 68 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1980) (applying 
principle of guided discretion for cruel and unusual punishment claims to vague factor 
used to determine applicability of death sentence); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280 (1976) (adopting the constitutional guided discretion principle and applying it 
to statute not permitting consideration of mitigating evidence). 
 69 See infra Part II.C.7. 
 70 See, e.g., McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (adopting single 
standard for excusing failure to state a claim in state procedural default and abuse of 
the writ cases). 
 71 Since 1996, the Court has granted the writ six times: Rompilla v. Beard, 
125 S.Ct. 2456, 2462-64 (2005) (granting the writ because of ineffective assistance of 
counsel); Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2339 (2005) (granting the writ because of 
improper exclusion of African-American jurors); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 693-94 
(2004) (overturning twenty-three-year-old death sentence where prosecution had 
withheld information relevant to impeachment); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 
(2003) (overturning death sentence for inadequate investigation by defense counsel); 
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04 (2001) (overturning death sentence based on 
juror bias and prosecutorial misconduct); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 440-42 
(2000) (overturning death sentence for inadequate investigation by defense counsel). 
The Court has also held that a habeas court could address the merits of a claim despite 
a state court’s reliance on a procedural bar.  Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002). 
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1. Frank and Moore 
In 1912 and 1923, respectively, the Supreme Court 
decided Frank v. Magnum72 and Moore v. Dempsey,73 two cases 
raising the question whether mob violence can undermine the 
fundamental fairness of a criminal trial.  These cases are often 
cited as watershed moments in the transformation of habeas 
doctrine from a limited remedy for cases in which courts lacked 
authority to punish – either because they lacked jurisdiction or 
the statute at issue was unconstitutional – to a broader remedy 
for ad hoc injustices in otherwise lawful proceedings.74   
Frank was a notorious case in which the influence of the 
mob on the trial is quite well documented.75  Nevertheless, the 
Court refused to grant the writ on the ground that the state 
had provided sufficient corrective process in the form of 
appellate review.76 
In Moore, the Court held that a hearing on the merits of 
the writ could go forward in similar, albeit even more 
egregious, circumstances.77  Justice Holmes distinguished the 
two cases, explaining that the corrective process in Moore was 
not “so adequate that interference by habeas corpus ought not 
to be allowed.”78  The state supreme court had opined only that 
it was not “necessarily” the case that the mob rendered the 
trial unfair, and it had prohibited a collateral inquiry into the 
facts necessary to prove otherwise.79 
The basis for the different outcomes in Frank and Moore 
has never been adequately explained.  Some have speculated 
that Moore de facto overruled Frank.80  But that claim is 
undermined by post-Moore cases in which the Court cited 
  
 72 237 U.S. 309, 324 (1915). 
 73 261 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1923). 
 74 Compare In re Eckart, 166 U.S. 481, 483 (1897) (denying review on habeas 
claim where the alleged error was “committed in the exercise of jurisdiction” and thus 
was not the sort of “jurisdictional defect, remediable by the writ”), with Waley v. 
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (holding that use of the writ to “test the 
constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where 
the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction”). 
 75 FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 53. 
 76 Frank, 237 U.S. at 335-36. 
 77 FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 68-85. 
 78 Moore, 261 U.S. at 91. 
 79 Id. at 91-92. 
 80 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 421 & n.30 (1963); Henry M. Hart, Jr., 
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 84, 105 (1968); Peller, supra note 20, at 646-48; Reitz, supra note 2, at 1329. 
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Frank with approval.81  Others have read Moore as an 
application of Frank.  Where Frank required state corrective 
process, Moore  rested on the lack of a state corrective process.82  
But that explanation is difficult to square with the availability 
of an appellate review process in both cases.83 
The judicial-power theory provides an alternative 
explanation for the results in these cases.  In Frank, the Court 
was addressing the problem of mob dominance on something of 
a clean slate.  And it was satisfied that the state supreme court 
had appreciated the problem and taken it seriously in 
upholding the judgment.84  In Moore, by contrast, the federal 
due process concern with mob influence was firmly established 
by Frank.  Given that, the state appellate court’s cursory 
dismissal of the issue was deemed unacceptable.85  The problem 
was not the lack of a protective process.  Rather, the Court 
bristled at the state court’s apparent brushing aside of an 
important federal concern with just a few unilluminating 
words.  
2. The Years Between Moore and Brown v. Allen 
Throughout the depression and World War II years, the 
Court sometimes used the writ more broadly to remedy 
constitutional violations that earlier decisions suggested were 
not remediable on habeas.86  The traditional explanation for 
  
 81 See, e.g., Ashe v. United States ex rel. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 426 (1926); 
Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 445 (1925). 
 82 See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 299 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment); Bator, supra note 30, at 484-89 (explaining that Frank required state 
corrective process to comport with due process and that the state court in Moore failed 
to provide it). 
 83 Liebman, supra note 29, at 2042-47. 
 84 Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 333 (1915). 
 85 Moore v. Demsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1923). 
 86 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (extending writ to 
challenge a claim that the FBI coerced a guilty plea and describing standard): 
The facts relied on are dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was 
not open to consideration and review on appeal. In such circumstances the 
use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a 
conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment of 
conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It 
extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in 
disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is 
the only effective means of preserving his rights. 
Id.; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 287 (1941) (extending habeas to cover same 
violation). 
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these cases is that the Court gradually expanded the scope of 
the writ in response to expanding notions of due process rights 
in criminal cases.87  Through the 1930s, due process required 
little more than conformity with a jurisdiction’s own law.88  By 
the late 1930s, however, the Court began to hold that the due 
process clause imposed more specific requirements on the state 
judicial systems.89  As it recognized these requirements, the 
traditional argument goes, the Court applied them on habeas 
until, in Brown v. Allen,90 it acknowledged that habeas review 
extended to all constitutional violations. 
This interpretation of the writ’s expansion fails to 
account for the Court’s repeated insistence during this period 
that habeas review did not extend to all constitutional 
violations.91  And certainly, nothing in the historical record of 
the deliberations in the Brown case suggests that the Court 
decided to reveal suddenly what it had been secretly doing for a 
decade.92  
The judicial-power theory, by contrast, explains why the 
Court used the writ only in certain cases.  When the law was 
debatable, the Court typically denied the writ.93 Where the 
Court had, by contrast, announced clear federal law, it used the 
  
 87 Wright, 505 U.S. at 298 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
 88 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1937) (holding aspect of 
double jeopardy clause prohibiting retrial after conviction on motion of the state not 
fundamental principle of liberty as demonstrated by disagreement among Justices of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in deciding the issue) (“Right-minded men, as we learn from 
those opinions, could reasonably, even if mistakenly, believe that a second trial was 
lawful in prosecutions subject to the Fifth Amendment, if it was all in the same case.”); 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106-110 (1908) (holding privilege against self-
incrimination not “a fundamental principle of liberty and justice”); Maxwell v. Dow, 
176 U.S. 581, 590-91 (1900) (same regarding right to a jury trial in a criminal case). 
 89 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 33 (1949) (holding that 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-68, 
273 (1948) (same regarding rights to public trial and to notice of charges); Brown v. 
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause prohibits introduction of evidence obtained from a coerced confession 
even though the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to the states). 
 90 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953). 
 91 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944) (explaining that federal habeas 
may not be used to challenge claims based on ineffective counsel and a prosecution’s 
knowing use of perjured testimony where adequate state processes were employed to 
test the claims); Ashe v. United States ex rel. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 426 (1926) (holding 
no basis to challenge in habeas an otherwise proper trial on two indictments 
simultaneously); Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 446 (1925)  (holding insufficiency of 
indictment may not be challenged on habeas). 
 92 FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 95-130 (citing internal memoranda among the 
Justices and their clerks). 
 93 See supra note 88. 
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writ to ensure that state courts respected its superior role.  For 
example, in a 1932 direct appeal, the Court held that the right 
to counsel in a capital case is a critical component of due 
process.94  Subsequently, on habeas review the Court concluded 
that the writ should issue if a lower court accepted a waiver of 
the right to counsel under anything but the strictest standard.95  
Similarly, in 1935 and 1936, respectively, the Court held that 
presenting perjured testimony96 and coercing a confession97 
violate fundamental principles of fairness.  In the early 1940s, 
the Court on habeas review analogized a coerced confession to 
a coerced guilty plea.98  Rather than establishing that 
constitutional claims became cognizable on habeas as soon as 
they became constitutional claims – a conclusion conflicting 
with language in other opinions during this period – these 
cases stand for the more limited proposition that the federal 
courts will exercise their power to grant the writ where a lower 
court appears to have ignored or trivialized the law articulated 
by a superior court. 
3. Brown v. Allen 
Brown has long been interpreted to hold that the writ 
reached all constitutional violations.99  But not everyone agrees 
with that reading.  The dense opinions in the case, and the lead 
opinion’s cryptic description of the inquiry into whether the 
state court had reached a “satisfactory conclusion,”100 have led 
some to speculate as to the Court’s actual intent.101  Eric 
  
 94 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
 95 House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46-47 (1945) (overturning denial of habeas in 
right-to-counsel case where state court had refused to address issue on the merits); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (extending habeas to review of waiver of 
counsel in capital case). 
 96 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (per curiam) (applying 
prohibition against use of perjured testimony). 
 97 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (holding that coerced 
confessions violate due process even though the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination does not apply to the states); id. at 287 (“The trial court knew that 
there was no other evidence upon which conviction and sentence could be based. Yet it 
proceeded to permit conviction and to pronounce sentence.”). 
 98 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942). 
 99 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). 
 100 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463 (1953). 
 101 Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 287 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“We had no 
occasion to explore in detail the question whether a ‘satisfactory’ conclusion was one 
that the habeas court considered correct, as opposed to merely reasonable, because we 
concluded that the constitutional claims advanced in Brown itself would fail even if the 
state courts’ rejection of them were reconsidered de novo.”). 
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Freedman’s historical research on the case, however, 
demonstrates that the scope of review was a critical point for 
the Court and that the majority intended to require de novo 
review of all constitutional claims.102   
The Court’s change of course in Brown has been 
explained as the culmination of events that had been occurring 
gradually for many years.  Different commentators point to 
different factors, but all of them center on changing attitudes 
toward criminal procedure rights and the appropriate way to 
enforce them.  These accounts would be quite persuasive if 
habeas doctrine had remained fixed after Brown.  But it did 
not, and the prior accounts fail to explain the initial continued 
expansion of the writ in the two decades after Brown as well as 
its subsequent contraction. 
The judicial-power theory’s explanation of Brown, by 
contrast, is  more consistent with later developments.  More 
than a response to changing social conceptions of liberty, 
Brown can be read as a peremptory strike at difficulties likely 
to arise because of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights.  By 
the early 1950s, the Court had held that the right to a public 
trial,103 the right to notice of charges,104 and the prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures105 applied to the 
states.  The contemporary struggle with desegregation served 
as a harbinger of the challenges attendant to extending federal 
criminal procedure rights to the states.  Just as the 1867 
Congress expanded habeas review, in Justice Brennan’s words, 
“anticipating Southern resistance to Reconstruction and to the 
implementation of the post-war constitutional Amendments,”106 
the 1953 Court, after having limited the scope of the 1867 Act 
for some 80 years, expanded habeas review anticipating state 
resistance to broader understandings of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
But Brown should not be overstated.  Four years before, 
the Court explicitly declined to apply the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule to the states,107 substantially limiting the 
number of cases in which constitutional issues would arise.  
  
 102 FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 95-130 (citing internal memoranda among the 
Justices and their clerks). 
 103 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-73 (1948). 
 104 Id. at 273. 
 105 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 22, 27-28 (1949). 
 106 William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An 
Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423, 426 (1961). 
 107 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33. 
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And by ruling against each petitioner in Brown – in one case 
without reaching the merits because of a minor procedural 
default in state court108 – the Court indicated that it did not 
intend to implement a pervasive new level of federal review.   
4. Mass Incorporation of Criminal Procedure Rights 
into the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Court’s 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio109 to apply 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states began a 
period during which the Court incorporated most of the 
criminal procedure protections in the Bill of Rights,110 and 
arguably some that were not there,111 into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Although the 
incorporation process continued for much of the decade, March 
18, 1963 stands out as a defining moment both for the 
substantive law made that day and for the procedural decisions 
governing federal habeas corpus. 
Substantively, the Court decided Gideon v. 
Wainwright112 and Douglas v. California,113 which held that 
defendants in state criminal proceedings had a federal 
constitutional right to counsel at trial and during a first appeal 
as of right. These decisions in conjunction with Mapp 
transformed the landscape facing habeas review.  Where the 
Brown Court may have assumed that constitutional challenges 
would continue to be extraordinary matters, by March 1963 the 
Court had abandoned that illusion.  Claims of illegally seized 
evidence and inadequate assistance of counsel could be brought 
  
 108 Daniels v. Allen, decided sub nom. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 
(1953). 
 109 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). 
 110 In the six years after Fay, the Court incorporated several criminal 
procedure rights: Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (privilege against self-
incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (right of confrontation); 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967) (right to a speedy trial); 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (right to compulsory process); Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-62 (1968) (right to a jury trial in a criminal case); 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969) (prohibition of double jeopardy). 
 111 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-69 (1966) (holding that even 
voluntary statements from a suspect subjected to custodial interrogation, but not 
warned of rights to remain silent and to counsel, must be excluded from evidence). 
 112 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that “in our adversary system of criminal 
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured 
a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him”). 
 113 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (holding that “where the merits of the one and 
only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think 
an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor”). 
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in virtually every criminal case, increasing exponentially the 
percentage of state criminal cases in which the defendant could 
seek federal habeas review.  As Judge Friendly declared in 
1970, “[t]oday, it is the rare criminal appeal that does not 
involve a ‘constitutional’ claim.”114 
The traditional habeas histories interpret this period as 
the inevitable extension of Brown’s holding that any 
constitutional claim was cognizable on federal habeas.  As each 
new right was applied to the states, this theory assumes, 
habeas doctrine naturally responded by providing a remedy for 
its violation.115  But there was nothing inevitable about what 
happened.  On the contrary, there were at least two other 
alternatives open to the Court.  It could have reaffirmed the 
limits on federal habeas that the Brown Court accepted, or 
even returned to the limits that it had applied before that case 
to guard against an onslaught of federal habeas litigation.  
Instead, it broadened the writ beyond anything that could have 
been anticipated after Brown.   
Given the likely dramatic expansion in federal 
constitutional claims in state criminal cases and thus the 
potential for federal habeas claims, the Court’s decision to take 
up key habeas corpus issues on the same day as the right-to-
counsel decisions was no mere coincidence.116 More interesting 
is the Court’s decision to impose sweeping and systematic 
oversight obligations on the federal courts in Townsend, with 
respect to fact finding, and Fay, with respect to review of 
claims defaulted in state court.117   
Again, the judicial power model explains these decisions 
consistently with later habeas doctrine.  Where the Brown 
Court may have foreseen state resistance to the few federal 
rights that had then been applied to the states, by 1963 the 
Court faced a certain period of confusion as states struggled to 
apply not only Mapp and Gideon, but also the federal rights 
  
 114 Friendly, supra note 40, at 156. 
 115 For example, after the Court decided in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 
(1961), that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule must apply in state cases, it soon 
used habeas review to enforce that decision.  See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 
560, 568-69 (1971) (granting writ where arrest warrant not supported by probable 
cause). 
 116 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
 117 Shortly thereafter, the Court issued a similarly sweeping decision dealing 
with successive petitions.  Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1963) (holding 
that even when a successive petition raises new claims “the federal judge clearly has 
the power – and, if the ends of justice demand, the duty – to reach the merits”). 
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that the Justices surely foresaw would be applied to the states 
in the ensuing five years.118 
Specific incidents of state court resistence or 
incompetence were surely a concern.119  But the Court also had 
more systemic issues in mind.  Even state courts that 
conscientiously sought to follow federal precedent had to rely 
on counsel who were not used to presenting federal issues in 
state criminal proceedings.  The 1963 Court may have intended 
two effects to flow from Fay and Townsend.  First, these cases 
would compel state trial judges and prosecutors to take a more 
proactive approach to federal constitutional questions, knowing 
that issues not raised in state proceedings could be re-litigated 
in federal court.120  Criminal trial judges have a knack for 
spotting issues that could give rise to an appeal.  The Court’s 
1963 cases can be seen as a way to force state trial judges to 
develop a similar “‘sixth sense’ to detect lurking constitutional 
questions.”121  Second, the federal judiciary was unaccustomed 
  
 118 Contemporaneously with Mapp, Justice Brennan, in a speech at the Utah 
Law School, predicted both the expansion of habeas as rights were incorporated into 
the Fourteenth Amendment and likely increased state resistance to habeas in light of 
its expanding scope.  Brennan, supra note 102, at 439-40.  The experience over the 
proceeding decade reviewing confession cases under due process principles likely gave 
the Justices insight into the reaction of state courts to new federal constitutional 
standards.  See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959) (“This is another in 
the long line of cases presenting the question whether a confession was properly 
admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  And in the month 
immediately following its March 1963 decisions, the Court itself vacated and remanded 
no less than eighteen habeas cases for reconsideration in light of Gideon: Hartsfield v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 782 (1963); Doughty v. Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781 (1963); Jordan v. 
Wiman, 372 U.S. 780 (1963); Douglas v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 779 (1963); Tull v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 778 (1963); Linder v. Nash, 372 U.S. 777 (1963); Patterson v. 
Warden, 372 U.S. 776 (1963); Tyler v. North Carolina, 372 U.S. 775 (1963); LaForge v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 774 (1963); Walker v. Randolph, 372 U.S. 773 (1963); Haynes v. 
Florida, 372 U.S. 770 (1963); Watt v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 769 (1963); Arnold v. Dir., 
Fla. Div. of Corr., 372 U.S. 769 (1963); Garner v. Pennsylvania, 372 U.S. 768 (1963); 
Vecchiolli v. Maroney, 372 U.S. 768 (1963); Weigner v. Russell, 372 U.S. 767 (1963); 
Rice v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 766 (1963); Hatten v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 766 (1963). 
 119 Brennan, supra note 102, at 439-40; Daniel J. Meador, The Impact of 
Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA. L. REV. 286, 290 (1966). 
 120 A few years after Fay and Townsend, Daniel Meador explained that the 
pre-1963  
system made it possible for the [state court] trial judge to assume a more or 
less passive role, relying on defense counsel to make objections and simply 
ruling on matters raised by the opposing parties. . . .  Correspondingly, the 
prosecution was under no pressure to expose the facts underlying . . . any . . . 
possible federal objection. 
Meador, supra note 119, at 287.  Fay and Townsend forced the prosecutor and trial 
judge to “[i]n effect . . . assume that defense counsel may not be doing his job.”  Id. at 
290. 
 121 Id. at 297. 
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to the routine of state criminal law practice.  The 1963 Court 
may thus have felt a need to compel the federal judiciary to 
impose greater scrutiny in federal habeas cases than it might 
otherwise have in order to ensure that state courts followed the 
law as proclaimed by the Supreme Court.122  
5. Townsend and Fay as Bridges to the Modern 
Restraints on Federal Habeas 
In 1963, the Court surely believed that regularized 
careful scrutiny of state criminal proceedings by federal habeas 
courts would be required during the disruptive period of 
incorporation.  And broad dicta in both Townsend and Fay 
encouraged that scrutiny.123  Both cases, however, can be 
interpreted more narrowly.  First, each can be read as an 
example of state defiance because they involved quite egregious 
incidents of state disdain for the law as articulated by the 
Supreme Court.124  Recognizing that habeas relief was 
appropriate in such instances did not require that it be 
available universally.  Second, both cases firmly accepted the 
notion that prudential considerations in some circumstances 
justified a federal court’s refusal to exercise habeas 
jurisdiction.  They thus left open the possibility for less active 
scrutiny of state procedures when the states adjusted to the 
new federal requirements.125 
  
 122 Joseph Hoffman and William Stuntz have argued that during this period 
“habeas served as the Supreme Court’s most powerful weapon, allowing it ultimately to 
prevail in reshaping the criminal justice systems of the states.”  Hoffman & Stuntz, 
supra note 6, at 83.   
  Commentators disagree on how readily state courts complied with new 
federal rights.  Compare Note, Gideon, Escobedo, Miranda: Begrudging Acceptance of 
the United States Supreme Court’s Mandates in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 346 (1969) 
(arguing that the state of Florida was slow to embrace new federal rights), with 
Meador, supra note 119, at 292 (arguing that “[t]he Court’s recent decisions regarding 
the procedural requirements of the fourteenth amendment seem to be given effect by 
state courts with no more than the normal divergence and time-lag to be expected 
between two different sets of courts”). 
 123 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426-38 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 
310-18 (1963). 
 124 Fay, 372 U.S. at 439-40 (holding that failure to appeal when faced with the 
possibility of being sentenced to death on retrial does not bar federal habeas relief); 
Townsend, 372 U.S. at 320-22 (holding that an evidentiary hearing must be held where 
state courts apparently applied the wrong legal standard and a critical fact was not 
considered in determining whether a confession was coerced). 
 125 Meador, supra note 119, at 299 (predicting that the Court would relax the 
requirements of Fay and Townsend when state courts became more accustomed to 
federal procedures). 
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a. The State Defiance Readings of Townsend 
and Fay 
In Townsend, the trial judge without any fact-finding or 
statement of grounds for his decision denied a motion to 
suppress a confession possibly induced by involuntarily 
administered drugs.126  Given the attention that the Court was 
then paying to coerced confessions,127 the knee-jerk denial of a 
serious motion likely irritated the Court. 
The situation in Fay was more complicated.  In 1942, 
Noia and two co-defendants were convicted based solely on 
confessions signed by each.128  Noia refrained from filing an 
appeal in part because he faced a potential death sentence on 
retrial (a prospect made all the more real by the trial court’s 
comments at sentencing).129  Noia’s co-defendants did appeal, 
albeit unsuccessfully.130  In 1952 and 1956, however, federal 
habeas courts held that the state extracted the confessions 
unconstitutionally and overturned Noia’s co-defendants’ 
convictions.131  
In light of those federal court decisions, Noia sought 
state court review of his case.  Although (1) the facts 
surrounding each question were essentially the same; (2) a 
state trial court held that the confession was coerced; and (3) 
the state admitted as much in federal habeas proceedings, the 
state courts ultimately refused to reach the merits on the 
ground that Noia, unlike his co-defendants, had not filed a 
timely appeal.132  That waiver, the state courts held, barred 
Noia from seeking relief. 
The state court’s decision to leave a federal 
constitutional violation unremedied obviously riled a majority 
of the Court.  Justice Brennan wrote that “surely no just and 
humane legal system can tolerate a result whereby [two men] 
are at liberty because their confessions were found to have 
been coerced yet a [third man], whose confession was also 
  
 126 Townsend, 372 U.S. at 302-03. 
 127 See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959) (“This is another in 
the long line of cases presenting the question whether a confession was properly 
admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 128 Fay, 372 U.S. at 395. 
 129 Id. at 397 n.3. 
 130 Id. at 392 & n.1.  They unsuccessfully sought additional state court review 
in 1947, 1948, and 1954.  Id. at 392 n.1. 
 131 Id. at 392 n.1. 
 132 Id. at 396 & nn.2-3. 
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coerced, remains in jail for life.”  Where a lower court decision 
amounts to such an “affront[] to the conscience of a civilized 
society,” the Court explained, habeas corpus is most 
appropriate.133  
b. Prudential Restraints on Jurisdiction 
Townsend and Fay solidified the concept originated in 
Ex parte Royall134 that federal courts need not exercise their 
habeas jurisdiction if prudential considerations weigh against 
it.  Where Royall permitted federal courts to dismiss a habeas 
case in which a petitioner had not exhausted state remedies, 
Townsend and Fay defined two additional situations in which 
federal courts need not reach the merits of a habeas petition.135  
During this period, the need to indoctrinate the state courts 
into federal constitutional criminal procedure justified 
regularized federal review.  Over time, however, that 
consideration would fade in importance and other prudential 
considerations would become more significant.  The opinions in 
Townsend and Fay, expansive as they were, left plenty of room 
for the scope of habeas review to change based on the perceived 
need at particular times to stem state defiance of federal law 
and the prudential considerations justifying deference to state 
decisionmaking.136   
6. Modern Restraints on Federal Habeas 
As systemic concerns with the judicial expansion of 
federal law to the states were replaced with acceptance of the 
dominant role of federal law in state criminal proceedings, 
  
 133 Fay, 372 U.S. at 441. 
 134 117 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1886) (holding federal court ordinarily should not 
reach merits of habeas claim unless state procedural avenues are first exhausted). 
 135 Fay, 372 U.S. at 438-39 (holding that federal judge may in certain cases 
refrain from exercising power to review merits of a constitutional claim); Townsend v. 
Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963) (holding federal judge has discretion to refuse to hold an 
evidentiary hearing in many cases despite having the power to conduct such a 
hearing). 
 136 Meador, supra note 119, at 286 (“[A]fter three years state trial practice in 
many places has not been adjusted to take [Fay and Townsend] into account.”); id. at 
299 (predicting that the requirements of Fay and Townsend would be relaxed when 
federal constitutional requirements were better integrated into state proceedings); 
Steiker, supra note 29, at 326 (“[D]efenders of Noia would be hard pressed to insist 
that Noia somehow struck the final balance.”); id. at 389 (“[T]he single greatest flaw 
animating current criticism of the Court’s new habeas is the notion that the balance 
struck in Noia and Sanders was a permanent one and that all further modifications of 
the writ therefore bear a presumption of illegitimacy.”). 
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habeas began to contract.  In a variety of different and 
apparently unrelated ways, a common thread can be seen.  
Habeas review was limited to cases in which state courts defied 
or trivialized federal law. 
a. Harmless Error 
In 1967, the Court first recognized that individual 
liberty interests did not compel a federal court to overturn a 
state criminal conviction infected with federal constitutional 
error.  In a direct appeal, the Court held that a criminal 
conviction should stand if the government could demonstrate 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would have been 
convicted even if the state had not violated the Constitution.137   
For many years, the Court assumed that the same 
harmless error standard applicable on direct appeal also 
applied to federal habeas review.138  In the 1990s, the Court 
adopted a broader harmless error standard for habeas review, 
holding that a federal court could grant the writ if the 
constitutional violation “had substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’”  The distinction in 
harmless error standards appears difficult to justify.  If federal 
review of constitutional errors on habeas is intended to deter 
state prosecutors and courts from violating the constitution, 
there is no basis for employing a more lenient harmlessness 
standard than is applicable to direct appeal.139  
If, however, the issue on habeas is whether the state 
court has defied or trivialized federal law, a different test may 
be appropriate.  The heavy burden placed on the state in 
individual-liberty-focused direct appeals becomes unnecessary 
when the focus of the inquiry on habeas shifts to the state 
court’s fidelity to federal law.  A state court that recognizes a 
presumably clear error of federal law should bear a significant 
burden to justify denying a remedy.  To hold otherwise would 
be to sanction open defiance of federal law.  By contrast, a state 
  
 137 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
 138 See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 
(1986); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523 
(1968) (per curiam). 
 139 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 644, 648 (1993) (White, J., 
dissenting) (describing use of a different standard for harmlessness on habeas as 
creating “illogically disparate treatment” based on the assumption that habeas is 
intended “to deter both prosecutors and courts from disregarding their constitutional 
responsibilities”). 
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court that fails to recognize an error that does not substantially 
affect the proceedings is not challenging the authority of a 
superior court system and thus need not meet such a heavy 
burden to justify the denial of habeas relief.  
b. The Guilty Plea Trilogy 
In 1970, the Court held that a constitutional violation 
would not support federal habeas relief if the petitioner had 
pled guilty with the appropriate assistance of counsel.140  The 
decision was announced through three cases decided on the 
same day – Parker v. North Carolina, McMann v. Richardson, 
and Brady v. United States – which together became known as 
the guilty plea trilogy.141  In these cases, the Court reasoned 
that a defendant who admits his guilt after receiving the 
effective assistance of counsel may be incarcerated even if the 
state violated a constitutional right in the process leading up to 
the plea.142 
  
 140 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797-98 (1970) (guilty plea may not 
be attacked on habeas despite erroneous advice of counsel that coerced confession 
would be admissible); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (guilty plea 
influenced by prior coerced confession may not be attacked on habeas); Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (guilty plea entered knowingly and voluntarily but 
pursuant to a statute, part of which the Court had found to be unconstitutional, may 
not be upset on habeas). 
 141 Parker, 397 U.S. at 797-98; McMann, 397 U.S. at 771; Brady, 397 U.S. at 
758.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 142 In the mid-1970s, the Court elaborated upon the reasoning in the guilty 
plea trilogy, explaining that 
The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of 
factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly 
removes the issue of factual guilt from the case.  In most cases, factual guilt 
is a sufficient basis for the State’s imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, 
therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not 
logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which 
do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established.  
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (holding that prohibition 
on collateral attack of guilty pleas does not rest on waiver).  See Tollett v. Henderson, 
411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973) (prohibiting collateral attack based on claim about which 
counsel and defendant could not have been aware, prohibiting waiver theory).  Even 
the Court’s decision permitting a guilty plea without an admission of guilt has been 
read this way.  Where he refused to admit guilt, 
the defendant could intelligently have concluded that, whether he believed 
himself to be innocent and whether he could bring himself to admit guilt or 
not, the State’s case against him was so strong that he would have been 
convicted anyway. Since such a defendant has every incentive to conclude 
otherwise, such a decision made after consultation with counsel is viewed as 
a sufficiently reliable substitute for a jury verdict that a judgment may be 
entered against the defendant. 
 
1266 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3 
The limits on habeas review applied in the guilty plea 
trilogy are difficult to explain.143  If a habeas petitioner has a 
sufficient liberty interest to justify granting the writ when he 
has been convicted by a jury and makes no claim of innocence, 
the defendant should have no less of a liberty interest when he 
pleads guilty.  The failure to review guilty plea cases also 
seriously undermines the writ’s deterrent function in the 
majority of cases that end in pleas, which of course are the 
majority of cases. 
By viewing habeas as a matter of judicial power, 
however, the results in these cases can be explained more 
easily.  A state that simply accepts a guilty plea is not defying 
or trivializing federal law as egregiously as one that continues 
to prosecute after wrongly denying a constitutional challenge.  
When the state’s conduct in accepting a plea did smack of 
defiance of federal law, the Court has permitted federal habeas 
review.144 
c. The Procedural Bar Cases 
For more than a decade, Fay required federal habeas 
courts to  reach the merits of a constitutional claim unless the 
defendant “deliberately by-passed” an avenue for relief in state 
court.145  In the mid-1970s, the Court began to narrow Fay’s 
holding.146  Although Fay’s holding that the federal courts had 
jurisdiction to reach claims defaulted in state court remained 
good law,147 the Court held that a federal court should decline 
to reach defaulted claims as a prudential matter unless the 
defendant could demonstrate both (1) cause attributable to the 
  
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 649 n.1 (1976) (White, J., concurring). 
 143 See Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An 
Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 
470-83 (1980) (discussing the many puzzles created by these cases). 
 144 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 31 (1974) (permitting collateral attack on 
guilty plea where prosecutor impermissibly charged more serious offense upon exercise 
of right to trial de novo on misdemeanor conviction). 
 145 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). 
 146 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85 (1977). 
 147 Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986) (“[A]lthough federal courts at all 
times retain the power to look beyond state procedural forfeitures, the exercise of that 
power ordinarily is inappropriate.”). 
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state for the failure to raise the claim;148 and (2) actual 
prejudice as a result of the alleged constitutional error.149  
The Court’s procedural default doctrine has baffled 
commentators.150  Similarly situated defendants are treated 
differently in federal habeas based on two factors that often 
have little to do with the defendant’s liberty interests: (1) 
whether the defendant’s attorney was skillful or prescient 
enough to raise the relevant federal constitutional claim at all 
of the required points in the state process;151 and (2) whether 
the state court chooses to address the merits of the claim 
despite any default.152  Such a disparity of outcome for similarly 
situated defendants mysteriously penalizes the individual for 
reasons that have nothing to do with the rights at stake153 and 
  
 148 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491-92 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 
107, 129-34 (1982). 
 149 Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494; United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).  
An additional exception was also recognized for petitioners who could show that they 
were probably innocent.  Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496 (“[W]here a constitutional violation 
has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal 
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the 
procedural default.”).  The Court has been quite strict in interpreting these tests to 
prevent federal habeas courts from reaching defaulted claims.  Dugger v. Adams, 489 
U.S. 401, 406-10 & 410 n.6 (1989). 
 150 In many ways, the Court simply returned the law to what it had been in 
the decade before Fay. In Brown v. Allen, the Court held that federal habeas corpus 
could not be used as an alternative to state processes of review that the defendant had 
by-passed.  344 U.S. 433, 485 (1953) (“To allow habeas corpus in such circumstances 
would subvert the entire system of state criminal justice and destroy state energy in 
the detection and punishment of crime.”).  Nonetheless, there has been substantial 
scholarly condemnation of the Court’s approach.  Friedman, supra note 43, at 251 (“The 
Court should have explained what it is about the writ of habeas corpus that entitles 
some petitioners to both federal and state review of constitutional claims, while other 
petitioners receive no adjudication of their claims on the merits.”); Graham Hughes, 
Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the Procedural 
Default Principle, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 321, 338 (1987-88); Frank J. 
Remington, Restricting Access to Federal Habeas Corpus: Justice Sacrificed on the 
Altars of Expediency, Federalism and Deterrence, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
339, 356 (1987-88); Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 362, 363 (1991). 
 151 Confusingly, the Court has found cause when a defendant could not have 
known about the basis for a claim, Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 3, 20 (1984), while holding 
that the universe of claims about which a defendant should have been aware is quite 
broad, extending to some claims that were percolating in, but not yet recognized by, the 
courts, Engle, 456 U.S. at 130-34 (denying habeas relief when petitioner could have 
been aware of the claim even though state court had rejected it). 
 152 If the state court overlooks a defendant’s procedural default and reaches 
the merits of the claim, federal review is appropriate.  Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 
320, 326-27 (1985); see Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 & n.11 (1989) (extending the 
“plain statement” rule to habeas review). 
 153 See, e.g., Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 113 (explaining that by 
barring defaulted claims from habeas review “defendants are routinely penalized for 
their lawyers’ errors” no matter how serious the constitutional violation); John C. 
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weakens the writ’s deterrent effect by encouraging reliance on 
procedural defaults whenever possible to insulate the state 
decision from federal review.154 
The judicial-power rationale for habeas, by contrast, 
explains both Fay and more recent doctrine.  In 1963, the Fay 
Court foresaw widespread confusion of both state courts and 
defense counsel with respect to the expansion of federal 
criminal procedure rights.155  A generation later, that concern 
was no longer broadly applicable.156  Yet, the Court remained 
concerned about ad hoc state defiance of federal rights.  Given 
that focus, current doctrine is quite coherent.  Federal courts 
retain the power to review state convictions despite adequate 
and independent state grounds for the denial of a federal 
constitutional claim if the Court senses state defiance.  A 
situation in which the defendant’s default is explicitly 
attributable to the state is one example.157  But others exist, 
and when they do the Court has found a way to reach the 
merits.158 
  
Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in 
Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 691-93 (1990) (same).  Of course, there 
are other factors that create apparent inequities between similarly situated 
defendants, including prosecutorial charging decisions, disparate plea bargaining 
policies, and differing jury compositions.  See Steiker, supra note 28, at 333.  But 
habeas courts are institutionally incapable of remedying these inequities, and the 
existence of irremediable inequities is little reason to create doctrine that needlessly 
generates additional inequities. 
 154 During the period from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s, the U. S. 
Supreme Court effectively encouraged this practice by prohibiting federal court review 
of constitutional claims subject to a procedural bar, while maintaining that federal 
courts must review properly presented claims de novo.  Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 
300-03 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating holding of Court that the federal 
habeas statute required federal habeas courts to review state court decisions on legal 
issues and most mixed questions of fact and law de novo).  If the federal court upheld 
the procedural bar, it conducted no substantive review.  But if it did not uphold the 
procedural bar, it applied completely de novo review.  After AEDPA, discussed infra 
II.C.8, of course, state courts have less to fear in this regard than they once did.  But 
even now, greater scrutiny is applied to the reasoned judgments of state courts than to 
the reflexive invocation of a procedural bar. 
 155 See supra Part II.C.4. 
 156 Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 67-68, 111. 
 157 Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 219, 228-29 (1988) (upholding district 
court’s grant of habeas when state officials deliberately hid information revealing 
racial discrimination in jury composition). 
 158 Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002) (addressing defaulted claim on 
habeas review without applying cause-and-prejudice test on ground that the case was 
an exceptional one “in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders 
the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question”). See Ford v. 
Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-25 (1991) (holding state court decision barring challenge to 
racial discrimination in jury selection on ground that claim was not timely raised was 
inadequate to bar federal review); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348 (1984) (same 
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d. Fourth Amendment Cases 
In Stone v. Powell,159 the Court held that as a prudential 
matter federal habeas courts should not review search-and-
seizure claims unless the state failed to provide an opportunity 
for full and fair litigation of the claim.160  In rejecting Fourth 
Amendment federal habeas claims, the Court relied primarily 
on the belief that state police are unlikely to perceive a 
significant additional deterrent from extending the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule to federal habeas review.161  
Congress, however, intended the writ to deter erroneous state 
court decisions.162  A state court, unlike state police, would 
likely perceive a deterrent as significant in search-and-seizure 
cases as it would in any other constitutional case. 
The judicial-power rationale, by contrast, explains the 
decision in Stone.  By 1976, Mapp had been in place for over a 
decade.  State courts were now comfortable resolving motions 
to suppress in criminal cases.  Unlike more controversial and 
less commonly litigated constitutional provisions, the Court 
could confidently presume that mistakes were just that: good 
faith errors in judgment about the constitutional protection, 
and not defiance of the legal pronouncement of a superior court 
or the product of systematic confusion with respect to an 
entirely new federal requirement.163  A state decision denying 
any procedural avenue for reviewing a motion to suppress, 
however, would rise to the level of defiance, and the Stone 
decision made clear that the Court would continue to address 
claims of that nature on habeas.164 
  
with respect to a claim that the court refused to instruct the jury not to draw a 
negative inference from the defendant’s failure to testify). 
 159 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
 160 Id. at 494. 
 161 Id. at 493-94. 
 162 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he threat 
of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts 
throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with 
established constitutional standards.” (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 
262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
 163 Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 n.35 (“[T]he argument that federal judges are more 
expert in applying federal constitutional law is especially unpersuasive in the context 
of search-and-seizure claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial level 
judges in both systems.”). 
 164 Id. at 494.  See Philip Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp 
Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1982) (advancing 
a similar rationale to explain why the Stone Court did not prohibit all collateral review 
of Fourth Amendment claims and interpreting Stone to permit habeas review of 
“‘systemic’” errors “in that their occurrence is, or is likely to become, widespread among 
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e. The Retroactivity Cases 
Contemporaneously with the expansion of federal 
constitutional rights, the Court developed retroactivity doctrine 
to prevent habeas courts from applying newly recognized rights 
to cases decided before those rights were announced.  For two 
decades, the Court handled retroactivity matters on an ad hoc 
basis considering (1) the purposes of the exclusionary rule; (2) 
the state’s reliance on an old rule; and (3) the effect of applying 
the new rule on the administration of the criminal justice 
system.165  These decisions produced a number of different 
outcomes, though most could reasonably be described as limits 
on the scope of habeas review.166 
In the late 1980s, the Court adopted a more bright-line 
approach to retroactivity.  It held that newly announced rules 
would apply to all criminal cases on direct review at the time 
the rule was announced,167 but that new rules generally would 
not apply on habeas review to a case in which the direct review 
process was completed before the rule was announced.168  The 
Court further defined the concept of a new rule expansively to 
include any decision about which reasonable jurists could differ 
with respect to the outcome.169 
  
the courts of a particular state”).  Some lower federal courts also expressed willingness 
to reach the merits of Fourth Amendment claims on habeas if a state court willfully 
refused to apply the controlling constitutional standard.  See, e.g., Riley v. Gray, 674 
F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Maxey v. Morris, 591 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 
1979); Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1978). 
 165 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (addressing 
retroactivity of constitutional rules respecting lineups); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 636-40 (1965) (discussing retroactive application of rule requiring states to apply 
exclusionary rule to evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 166 Teague, 489 U.S. at 302 (plurality opinion) (explaining that retroactivity 
doctrine had been used “to limit application of certain new rules to cases on direct 
review, other new rules only to the defendants in the cases announcing such rules, and 
still other new rules to cases in which trials have not yet commenced”). 
 167 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987). 
 168 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (plurality opinion). 
 169 See id. at 301 (“[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated 
by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”); see also 
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (holding that the Court announces a new 
rule where “the outcome . . . was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds”); 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Few decisions on appeal or 
collateral review are ‘dictated’ by what came before.  Most such cases involve a 
question of law that is at least debatable, permitting a rational judge to resolve the 
case in more than one way.  Virtually no case that prompts a dissent on the relevant 
legal point, for example, could be said to be ‘dictated’ by prior decisions.”).  For 
applications of this new doctrine, see Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 233-41 (1990); 
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488-94 (1990). 
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All retroactivity doctrine is inconsistent with an 
individual liberty rationale for habeas because the liberty to 
which particular individuals should be entitled does not vary 
based on the timing of the announcement of a criminal 
procedure right.  An individual should not forfeit constitutional 
protection because the courts hearing his case lacked the 
foresight to recognize the full extent of the law. 
Some have argued that current retroactivity doctrine is 
consistent with a federal review theory of habeas – that one is 
entitled to federal court review of a federal claim – because the 
defendant receives the same level of scrutiny that would have 
been available had the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review the case.170  But that reasoning is flawed.  Had the 
Court agreed to hear the case on direct appeal it would have 
been free to recognize any claimed right that it found in the 
Constitution.  Under modern retroactivity doctrine that aspect 
of federal review is lost once a case enters the habeas process.  
A federal habeas court may apply only clearly established law. 
Others argue that a state court cannot be deterred when 
its only error is the failure to apply a constitutional rule that 
has yet to be announced.  But that description of the role of the 
state courts understates the duty of all courts to faithfully 
apply the Constitution, not just the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of it.171  Even outright reversals of prior 
  
 170 Liebman, supra note 30, at 2095-96; Steiker, supra note 61, at 922 
(assuming Court did not define the concept of a new rule too broadly). 
 171 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (asserting that “Judges in every State shall be 
bound” by federal law).  The Supreme Court has long recognized that Article VI 
demands that state judges fully enforce federal law even at the expense of conflicting 
state law.  As the first Justice Harlan described the obligation: 
Upon the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the 
obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the 
Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, 
whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceeding before them; for 
the judges of the State courts are required to take an oath to support that 
Constitution, and they are bound by it, and the laws of the United States 
made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under their authority, as 
the supreme law of the land, “anything in the Constitution or laws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding.”  If they fail therein, and withhold or 
deny rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, the party aggrieved may bring the case from the highest 
court of the State in which the question could be decided to this court for final 
and conclusive determination. 
Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884); see Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 
(1935) (“Upon the state courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the 
obligation to guard and enforce every right secured by that Constitution.” (citing Robb, 
 
1272 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure can sometimes be 
anticipated,172 and more often there is no clear guidance in the 
case law.  Modern retroactivity doctrine thus surely lessens the 
deterrent force that habeas would exert if state courts were 
compelled to decide cases as the U.S. Supreme Court would 
today, rather than merely as it has decided them in the past. 
Once again, however, the judicial power rationale 
explains the doctrine.  If an inferior court is applying the 
precedents of a superior court in a reasonable fashion, it is not 
defying the law as proclaimed by the lawmaker.  Reasonable 
applications of existing law thus need not be scrutinized under 
a habeas regime that exists to insure only against outright 
defiance or trivialization of the law announced by the high 
court.173 
Despite the ostensibly bright-line nature of modern 
retroactivity doctrine, the Court has found ways to grant the 
writ when it senses state court defiance.  At least three cases 
  
111 U.S. at 637)); Semeraro, supra note 5, at 926-27 (applying this rationale to modern 
habeas doctrine). 
 172 For example, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision granting the writ on the ground 
that the execution of a seventeen-year-old murderer was categorically unconstitutional.  
Id. at 578-79.  That decision directly conflicted with federal law established in Stanford 
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), which upheld the death penalty for minors.  Roper, 
543 U.S. at 556.  Nevertheless, the Missouri court correctly concluded that subsequent 
developments would lead the U.S. Supreme Court to decide the case differently in 2005 
than it had in 1989.  State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399-400 (2003) 
(en banc). 
  A second example arises out of the Court’s decision to overrule prior 
precedent and permit constitutional attacks on racial discrimination in the selection of 
individual juror panels.  In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court 
overturned its prior decision in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).  Batson, 476 
U.S. at 90-93.  Prior to Batson, however, in a case in which the Court denied certiorari, 
five Justices had indicated serious concern with the rule in Swain.  McCray v. New 
York, 461 U.S. 961, 961-62 (1983) (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun & Powell, JJ.); id. 
at 964-65 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).  Although the Court 
ultimately refused to apply Batson retroactively to the date on which certiorari was 
denied in McCray, Teague, 489 U.S. at 295-96, state courts would surely have been 
aware of the potential for a change in the law. 
 173 The Court’s application of its habeas doctrine supports this interpretation.  
It has generally refused to upset state decisions that reasonably apply existing federal 
law even in the face of clear evidence that the practice later held unconstitutional 
tended to produce a higher proportion of death sentences.  Compare Simmons v. South 
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (requiring that the jury be instructed that an 
alternative to the death sentence is life without possibility of parole where the state 
introduces evidence of future dangerousness as an aggravating factor), with O’Dell v. 
Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 172 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (refusing to apply 
Simmons retroactively despite evidence that sentencing juries are significantly less 
likely to impose a death sentence if instructed that a life sentence will not include the 
possibility of parole). 
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fit this mold.  In Penry v. Lynaugh,174 a five-member majority 
feared Texas had defied federal law by abandoning its promise 
that the state’s death penalty law would permit the sentencer 
to consider all mitigating circumstances.175  In Penry, the Court 
first recognized that Texas did not provide an avenue for the 
sentencing jury to give effect to mitigating evidence of mental 
retardation.176  The five-to-four split demonstrated beyond 
question that the substantive law was debatable. Nonetheless, 
the Court granted the writ.177   
A similar result occurred in Stringer v. Black,178 a case 
in which the Court likely concluded that Mississippi had 
trivialized the federal constitutional rule that vague factors 
could not be used to determine eligibility for a death 
sentence.179  In Stringer, the Mississippi Supreme Court, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and three dissenting Justices on 
the U.S. Supreme Court all concluded that Mississippi’s 
approach did not violate prior federal law.180  Nevertheless, the 
six-member majority held that reasonable minds could not 
differ and granted the writ.181  
The same concern likely explains the result in Yates v. 
Aiken,182 in which the state relied on a rebuttable presumption 
to establish an element of the crime.  The Supreme Court held 
in Francis v. Franklin183 that such a presumption was 
unconstitutional, and remanded Yates for reconsideration in 
light of that decision.184  The state court refused to consider 
Francis, holding instead that a previously decided state case 
  
 174 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 175 Id. at 327; see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272-74 (1976). 
 176 Penry, 492 U.S. at 320. 
 177 Id. at 315 (holding that claim did not impose new obligation on the state 
because petitioner “simply asks the state to fulfill the assurance upon which Jurek was 
based: namely, that the special issues would be interpreted broadly enough to permit 
the sentencer to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence that a defendant may 
present in imposing a sentence”). 
 178 503 U.S. 222 (1992). 
 179 The Court stressed the importance of careful review in Stringer, id. at 230, 
a point it had made repeatedly in earlier cases.  See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 
862, 890 (1983); Jurek , 428 U.S. at 276; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1976); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976); Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 717 
(1949). 
 180 Stringer, 503 U.S. at 226-27 (describing prior proceedings in the case, all of 
which affirmed the death sentence); id. at 247 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing two other 
Fifth Circuit cases denying habeas review in cases alleging the same error). 
 181 Id. at 227-37. 
 182 484 U.S. 211 (1988). 
 183 471 U.S. 307 (1985). 
 184 Yates v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 896 (1985). 
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reaching the same holding did not apply retroactively to Yates’s 
case.185  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state 
could not deny relief on retroactivity grounds because Francis 
had not announced a new rule, but instead applied an old one 
existing prior to Yates’s trial.186  In Francis itself, however, four 
Justices had dissented, and three of them explicitly argued 
that the Court’s decision was not dictated by precedent but had 
“needlessly extend[ed]” the holdings in prior cases.187  Despite 
the disagreement among the Justices, the Court unanimously 
granted the writ in Yates, in all likelihood because of the state 
court’s defiance of the federal mandate to apply Francis.188 
7. The Death Penalty Cases 
At the same time that the Court was restraining the 
scope of habeas generally, it used the writ – and allowed lower 
federal courts to use it – quite liberally to enforce the death 
penalty jurisprudence that the Court developed in the late 
1970s.  As an initial matter, cases identifying constitutional 
flaws in death penalty statutes led to the overturning of all 
death sentences, retroactivity concerns notwithstanding.  Even 
after the states adopted ostensibly constitutional death 
sentencing statutes, the federal courts continued to police those 
statutes carefully for many of the same types of constitutional 
concerns first applied to state criminal trials in the 1960s.189  
And for nearly a decade, the Court all but ignored retroactivity 
  
 185 Yates v. Aiken, 349 S.E.2d 84, 85 (S.C. 1986) (asserting that the state “is 
free to determine our own standards regarding retroactivity of state decisions”). 
 186 Yates, 484 U.S. at 216-17. 
 187 Francis, 471 U.S. at 332-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 188 Yates, 484 U.S. at 214-15 (“The portion of the state court’s opinion 
concluding that the instruction in petitioner’s case was infirm for the reasons 
‘addressed in Francis’ was responsive to our mandate, but the discussion of the 
question whether the decision in Elmore should be applied retroactively was not.  Our 
mandate contemplated that the state court would consider whether, as a matter of 
federal law, petitioner’s conviction could stand in the light of Francis. Since the state 
court did not decide that question, we shall do so.”). 
 189 See, e.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446-47 (1981) (applying 
principles of double jeopardy to capital sentencing); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627 
(1980) (requiring lesser-included-offense instruction where supported by the evidence 
in a capital case); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (holding that “the hearsay 
rule may not be used mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice” by excluding 
evidence in mitigation of a death sentence at a capital sentencing trial); Presnell v. 
Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16-17 (1978) (prohibiting imposing death penalty on basis of 
evidence supporting a charge on which no jury finding of guilt was rendered); Gardner 
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (holding that state may not base death sentence on 
information not disclosed to defendant). 
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questions as federal habeas courts granted the writ in forty 
percent of capital cases.190 
Even when the Court purported to extend its habeas 
restrictions to capital cases, as it did  with respect to 
procedurally barred claims191 and those seeking to apply new 
rules of constitutional law,192 it was more willing to ignore a 
restriction when faced with what it saw as state court defiance 
of its commands.193   
For example, in Hitchcock v. Dugger,194 the Court 
granted the writ based on a claim that the sentencer was 
prohibited from considering relevant mitigating evidence.  Full 
consideration of that type of evidence was by then a firmly 
established principle.195  The defendant, however, had never 
objected to a restraint on the scope of admissible mitigating 
evidence,196 and the state supreme court apparently denied the 
challenge for that reason.197  Yet, the Court granted the writ 
without mentioning the default issue, presumably to make the 
  
 190 James S. Liebman, Lesson Unlearned, 253 THE NATION 217 (1991) 
(between 1976 and 1990, federal courts found constitutional violations justifying 
overturning a death sentence in forty percent of the capital cases brought to federal 
court). 
 191 In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986), the Court applied the cause-
and-prejudice standard to an error in a capital sentencing trial without any alteration 
from the demanding showing that must be made in a non-capital case.  Compare id. at 
530, 539 (holding constitutional claim procedurally barred in a capital case), with 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 497-98 (1986) (holding constitutional claim 
procedurally barred in a non-capital case under the same standard); compare Coleman 
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 738  (1991) (assuming state court intended to rely on 
independent state procedural default rule when Court summarily denied claim), with 
Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955) (refusing in a pre-Furman case to 
assume that state court would rely on procedural bar to deny consideration of a 
challenge to the jury panel in a capital case). 
 192 See supra note 169 (citing capital cases applying the restrictive 
retroactivity doctrine announced in Teague). 
 193 Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796-804 (2001) (granting writ on ground 
that new state jury instruction on the jury’s use of evidence of mental retardation was 
inadequate even though Court had never considered that argument before); Maynard 
v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362-65 (1988) (granting writ on ground that an 
aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague even though that circumstance 
had not previously been deemed vague by the Court); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 
393, 397-98 (1987). 
 194 481 U.S. 393 (1987). 
 195 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (holding that capital defendant 
must have opportunity to present all relevant mitigating evidence). 
 196 Brief of Petitioner at 29-31, Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (No. 
85-6756) 1986 WL 728190  (arguing the failure to object should not preclude claim). 
 197 Hitchcock v. State, 413 So. 2d 741, 748 (Fla. 1982) (denying claim on the 
ground that defense counsel had presented all mitigating evidence that he concluded 
necessary). 
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point that its mitigating evidence rule should not be trivialized 
by the state courts. 
8. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 
In 1996, Congress institutionalized and strengthened 
many of the restraints that the Court had previously 
adopted.198  One might have expected this Congressional 
affirmation of the Court’s restrictive approach to embolden the 
Justices to effectively end federal habeas review except in cases 
embodying the most extreme and uncontroversial denials of 
liberty.  But that has not happened.  Instead, the Court has 
shown a continued willingness to grant the writ even in cases 
in which only a slim majority perceives that the state court 
ignored or trivialized federal law.199 
For example, in 1984 the Court adopted a test to 
determine whether trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective.200  Through the 1996 enactment of the habeas 
reform act, the Court had never granted the writ based on a 
claim of ineffective counsel.  Since 1996, however, a divided 
Court has three times found meritorious ineffective counsel 
claims,201 despite the formally stricter standard of review.202  
Similarly, in the two decades before the 1996 Act, the Court in 
a habeas case had never reached the merits of a procedurally 
defaulted claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice.  Yet, 
in the 2002 Lee v. Kemna203 case, the Court did exactly that.204  
  
 198 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(2000) (strengthening exhaustion of state remedies and retroactivity doctrines). 
 199 See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04 (2001) (six-to-three decision 
rejecting a new jury instruction on the use of evidence of mental retardation in a 
capital case that the state intended to cure the constitutional defect in the instruction 
used at the defendant’s original trial). 
 200 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 791 (1984). 
 201 Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2467-69 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 523-30 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 439-40 (2000). 
 202 Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002) (“For [a petitioner] to succeed [on 
an ineffectiveness claim] he must do more than show that he would have satisfied 
Strickland’s test if his claim were being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 
2224(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent 
judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, he must 
show that the [state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively 
unreasonable manner.”) (citation omitted). 
 203 534 U.S. 362 (2002). 
 204 Id. at 376 (addressing defaulted claim on habeas review without applying 
cause-and-prejudice test on ground that the case was an exceptional one “in which 
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III. EXPLAINING HABEAS DOCTRINAL CHANGE THROUGH THE 
CONFLICTING-IDEOLOGIES THEORY 
A unifying weakness among the explanations for 
changes in habeas doctrine, including the judicial-power 
theory, is that each interprets the doctrine as a response to a 
need external to the habeas system.  Some see new habeas 
doctrine as a response to evolving social attitudes about 
individual liberty, arguing only about which liberty interest is 
important enough to justify the writ’s protection.205  Others 
view habeas doctrine as part of a broader response to the social 
forces shaping global shifts in federal court review of trial-level 
decisions.206  Still others see habeas as responding to societal 
demands for differing safeguards against error in the criminal 
justice system depending on the type of right allegedly 
violated.207 And the judicial-power theory interprets the 
development of habeas doctrine as a response to externally 
created instability in the criminal justice system. 
None of these accounts are wrong.  Indeed, all of them 
contribute something to our understanding of the writ’s 
evolution.  But each account is incomplete in a way that makes 
the need-response hypothesis misleading.  To achieve a fuller 
understanding of the development of federal habeas doctrine 
one must look beyond doctrinal responses to society’s evolving 
attitudes about criminal law and take account of the ideological 
role that habeas corpus doctrine has played in shaping those 
attitudes.208 
Throughout the twentieth century, more or less 
systematic crises threatened the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system.  Examples include convictions tainted by mob 
violence209; barbaric, brutal treatment of suspects210; disturbing 
  
exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to 
stop consideration of a federal question”). 
 205 See supra Part I.B. 
 206 See id. 
 207 See id. 
 208 Cf. Robert Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 
1021 (1981) (concluding that a rich understanding of the U.S. Constitution requires an 
understanding of the prevailing legal ideology of the era in addition to social and 
economic influences). 
 209 The problem of mob influence on criminal proceedings during this era is 
highlighted by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 
(1915), and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).  FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 55-64, 
68-91 (describing the Frank and Moore cases). 
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psychological gamesmanship to coerce confessions211; the crime 
wave of the 1970s and 1980s212; concerns about the death 
penalty213; and most recently the challenge of dealing with 
those accused of international terrorism.214  In each case, 
habeas corpus doctrine developed as it did not just in response 
to social concerns about inappropriate interference with 
individual liberty, but also as a creative force that played a role 
in how we saw and understood those developments.  Habeas 
ideology helped create a way of thinking about criminal law 
that enabled different parts of society to accept a system for 
protecting individual liberty, despite an equally firm 
commitment to law enforcement, that might otherwise not 
have developed.   
This Part explores the creative aspects of habeas corpus.  
All legal doctrine, being part of a social structure, will have 
some creative impact on the development of social attitudes 
and new doctrine.215  The role of habeas corpus may be more 
complex, however, because of fundamentally contradictory 
attitudes in American society about criminal law.  We fear the 
prospect of wrongfully denying liberty,216 while we 
  
 210 For example, the 1931 Wickersham Report brought to light the use of 
“third degree” treatment to obtain confessions from suspects.  Schaefer, supra note 2, 
at 10-11. 
 211 This practice was described in some detail by the Court in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-58 (1966). 
 212 Violent crime rates increased dramatically from approximately 160 
incidents per 100,000 population in the early 1960s to nearly 600 incidents by 1980.  
After a brief leveling off period, the rate again increased to over 720 incidents by the 
early 1990s.  A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE UNITED STATES: SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND 
TRENDS 245-46 (Patricia C. Becker, ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
 213 Death penalty concerns include the moratorium prior to the Court’s 1972 
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and the immediate response to the 
Furman decision by nearly three dozen states to adopt new death penalty laws.  John 
W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal 
Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 226-
27, 238-41 (1986). 
 214 The Court recently decided two habeas cases arising out of the aftermath 
of the September 11th attacks, holding that American citizens held as enemy 
combatants may challenge the factual basis of their detention, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 533 (2004), and that the federal courts have jurisdiction over detainees held 
in Guantanamo, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004). 
 215 Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60-62 (1984). 
 216 The principle is often described in the phrase: “one would much rather that 
twenty guilty persons should escape the punishment of death than that one innocent 
person should be condemned and suffer capitally.”  Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 
432, 455 (1895) (quoting De Laudibus Legum Angliae).  Similar formulations of this 
maxim date back to the Roman Empire – “it was better to let the crime of a guilty 
person go unpunished than to condemn the innocent,” id. at 454 (quoting Trajan); “it is 
better five guilty persons should escape unpunished than one innocent person should 
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simultaneously question the criminal justice process – the 
constitutional rights of suspects and the accused – that makes 
our fear of convicting an innocent less likely to materialize.217  
The criminal law is but one of many areas of law 
infected by equally strong commitments to conflicting goals.  
Most often, commentators analyzing this doctrine have 
observed oscillation in the doctrine. As a favored pole appears 
to be producing undesirable results, the doctrine swings back 
toward the other.  A stable resting place is never reached, 
because the contradictory commitments cannot be balanced.  A 
strong commitment to each pole always provides a compelling 
ground to shift doctrine to the other pole.218 
Habeas ideology may have enabled constitutional 
criminal procedure doctrine partially to avoid this oscillation.  
An ideology in which habeas corpus is widely revered as the 
  
die,” id. at 456 (quoting Lord Hale); “the law holds that it is better that ten guilty 
persons escape than that one innocent suffer,” id. at 456 (quoting Blackstone); SIR 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KT., COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, BOOK IV, CHAP. 
XXVII, § 406 at 358 (William Carey Jones ed., 1976).  More recently, the Supreme 
Court has used the principle to justify finding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a 
constitutional requirement of due process, see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 
(1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970); and that a jury of less than six 
violates the Sixth Amendment, Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978) (relying in 
part on fact that a smaller number of jurors would increase “the risk of convicting an 
innocent person” even though it would decrease the “risk of not convicting a guilty 
person”). 
 217 See, e.g., Susan Blaustein, Congress’s Drive-By Killing: Crimes Against 
Habeas Corpus, THE NATION, June 20, 1994, at 71 (quoting Representative Charles 
Canady as explaining that he opposed efforts to undue Supreme Court restraints on 
habeas because “[h]ow can anyone explain to the American people . . . that we should 
grant convicted murderers on death row more opportunities to delay . . . justice – and 
more opportunities to torment the families of their victims? Let me tell you, the people 
will not buy it.”). 
 218 Mark Kelman summarized the critical view of law as infested with 
contradiction, writing that “liberal thought” can be seen as “a system of thought that is 
simultaneously beset by internal contradiction (not by ‘competing concerns’ artfully 
balanced until a wise equilibrium is reached, but by irreducible, irremediable, 
irresolvable conflict).”  MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 3 (1987). 
Commentators have identified pervasive conflicts in a wide variety of legal doctrines.  
Many focus on the choice between strict rules and open-ended standards in choosing 
the form of legal doctrine.  See, e.g., Al Katz & Lee Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction, the 
Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule of Law, 53 IND. L.J. 1 (1978) (juvenile supervision 
orders); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685 (1976) (contract law); Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 
87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177 (2002) (antitrust refusal-to-deal doctrine); Carol Rose, 
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (property rules); 
William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE 
L.J. 1198 (1983) (welfare system operation).  Conflicts based on intentionalistic and 
deterministic accounts of human conduct have also been identified. Clare Dalton, An 
Essay on the Deconstruction of Contract Law, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985) (contract law); 
Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 591 (1981) (criminal law). 
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ultimate protector of liberty helps mediate the contradiction in 
our beliefs about criminal law by allowing us to believe that 
those improperly incarcerated are never without a potential 
remedy.  During those periods where the rights of the accused 
have expanded, habeas ideology has played a powerful role in 
both (1) motivating and emboldening Supreme Court Justices 
to enhance liberty by transforming state criminal procedure 
and (2) enabling state courts to accept those changes.   
Just as American society’s love of liberty is tempered by 
a fear of crime, habeas ideology too has come to embody a 
darker side.  This counter-habeas ideology conjures up a world 
in which the writ unjustly honors anti-social deviants as 
constitutional crusaders and rewards them undeservedly with 
freedom.  Ironically, however, this aspect of the ideology too 
may ultimately advance liberty interests.  It does so by 
enabling those who would narrow constitutional criminal 
procedure rights to imagine a restrictive writ in which convicts 
whose rights have been violated are nonetheless denied a 
remedy.  Disturbing as that result may be to one who is 
committed to a regime of expansive rights, it preserves liberty 
interests by inhibiting judges and legislators from eroding the 
substantive content of those rights.   
The following sub-sections briefly explore how habeas 
ideology has helped shape the existing regime of liberty-
enhancing rights.219 
A. Stimulating The Expansion of Criminal Procedure 
Rights 
Commentators have long recognized that habeas corpus 
held a special place in the ideology of the early United States.220  
  
 219 To fully understand the creative aspects of habeas doctrine one would need 
to explore the legal history of the United States in considerable depth, a project that 
would extend far beyond the scope of this Article.  This Part attempts to open the 
exploration by looking to some newly accessible sources of political and legal 
commentary that provide a glimpse into the role habeas has played in American legal 
history.  The searchable database of articles in The Nation dating back to the 1860s, 
and the Gale Group’s equally accessible “Making of Modern Law” database, which 
gathers historical journals and treatises dating back to the early nineteenth century, 
provide many intriguing references to habeas corpus.  As more databases of this type 
are created, historical research will become a more manageable task. 
 220 That a strong habeas ideology existed in the early United States is 
virtually uncontested.  Historians of the era have found “abundant evidence of an early 
and persisting attachment to ‘this darling privilege’ in pre-1787 America.”  Francis 
Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 602, 608 & n.16. “The 
prestige of the [English habeas corpus] Act of 1679, was so high that several states 
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In one commentator’s words, “habeas corpus was deeply 
embedded in the interstices of colonial thought . . . .”221  
Nineteenth Century views were no different.  The legal 
historian Rollin Carlos Hurd wrote of “the favorable regard of 
the people” for the writ, and he explained that habeas “became 
inseparably associated with [the] right [of personal liberty]; 
and in proportion as the right was valued, so was the writ by 
which it was defended.”222  By the 1860s, virtually every state 
had enshrined the writ in its own constitution.223   
The most fundamental legal battles of the mid-
nineteenth century were intertwined with and influenced by 
habeas corpus ideology.  Fugitive slave laws were attacked 
through habeas corpus proceedings seeking to free both (a) 
detained slaves who were attempting to flee slave-holding 
states and (b) those who aided slaves in their escape.224  
Critically, much of this litigation was based on the theory that 
state courts had jurisdiction to free prisoners held pursuant to 
federal authority.  Federal courts had proven remarkably 
unreceptive to antislavery arguments.  Reformers used habeas 
corpus proceedings to create “a sharply defined struggle 
between state and federal courts” to restore dialogue on the 
antislavery issue.225  The Wisconsin Supreme Court responded, 
granting the writ to free two men convicted under federal law 
of aiding and abetting an escaped slave.226  Although the U.S. 
Supreme Court ultimately upheld the supremacy of federal 
  
enacted almost word-for-word copies and others almost certainly regarded it as part of 
their common law.”  Id. at 622 & n.64.  During the debates surrounding the drafting of 
the Constitution, no one questioned the importance of the writ.  Id. at 608-17; see 
FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 12-18; Cantor, supra note 2, at 74 (explaining that the writ 
“was taken for granted by the delegates”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 557 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed., 1941) (noting the importance of habeas 
corpus as a protection against the “the practice of arbitrary imprisonments,” which 
Hamilton labeled one of the “favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny”). By 
1800, seven of the original thirteen colonies had adopted habeas statutes, and others 
surely had recognized the writ through common law practice.  Cantor, supra note 2, at 
72-73. 
 221 Cantor, supra note 2, at 73. 
 222 ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON 
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE CONNECTED WITH IT: WITH A VIEW OF 
THE LAW OF EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVES 144 (Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 1858). 
 223 Oaks, supra note 11, at 249; see also E. INGERSOLL, THE HISTORY AND LAW 
OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 39-46 (Philadelphia, T.K. & P.G. Collins 1849) 
(discussing the use of the writ in various states during the first half of the nineteenth 
century). 
 224 ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 159-91 (1972) (discussing fugitive slave act litigation). 
 225 Id. at 182. 
 226 In re Booth & Rycraft, 3 Wis. 157, 176 (1854). 
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law,227 the writ’s importance to the antislavery movement 
cannot be overstated. 
Lincoln’s decision to suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
ignited a new period of debate that drew on habeas ideology.  
Much legal scholarship played to the vaulted image of habeas 
in attacking Lincoln’s decision.  One commentator declared 
that “[t]he nation is now afflicted with two terrible wars going 
on together.  The war against the Union, and a war against the 
Constitution . . . .  Each wears a threatening aspect of great 
peril.”228  Another commentator wrote that 
[l]ying at the foundation of all our liberties is the great Writ of 
Freedom. . . . [L]et us above all things, preserve the integrity of that 
hallowed instrument in all its parts; but most especially in those 
features of it which embrace and guarantee the liberties of the 
people. 
. . . [I]n defending this priceless Writ of liberty, we are simply 
vindicating the authority of the people.229 
Even after the war, habeas doctrine and its 
accompanying ideology continued to shape the debate.  Political 
commentary repeatedly cited Lincoln’s decision to suspend the 
writ as emblematic of more general criticism about 
governmental restraints on liberty.230 
Habeas also played a central role in the legal battle to 
define the rights of Native American Indians.  Arguing against 
confinement to specific Indian territories, counsel for Standing 
Bear “traced the history of the writ of habeas corpus from its 
origin, and claimed that it applied to every human being.  
He . . . showed that the position taken by the government 
  
 227 Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858). 
 228 S.S. NICHOLAS, A REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND 
ATTORNEY GENERAL BATES, IN FAVOR OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER TO SUSPEND THE 
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 21 (Louisville, Bradley & Gilbert 1861). 
 229 A MEMBER OF THE PHILADELPHIA BAR, REPLY TO HORACE BINNEY ON THE 
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 3 (Philadelphia, 
James Challen & Son 1862). 
 230 Circumstances Alter Cases, 2 THE NATION 487, 487 (1866) (describing those 
who opposed war time restraints on liberty as “[s]tern patriots, who denounced 
Abraham Lincoln as a tyrant and a usurper for suspending the habeas corpus”); 
Congress and the Constitution, 4 THE NATION 254, 254 (1867) (chastising “[s]ome 
journals – the New York Times for one – which, during the war, unhesitatingly 
justified the suspension of the habeas corpus without the authority of Congress”); The 
Desperadoes and Habeas Corpus, 20 THE NATION 108 (1875) (using suspension of 
habeas corpus as the leading rhetorical device in attacking the Klu Klux Klan Act of 
1871); Mr. Jennings on Republican Government in the United States, 6 THE NATION 133 
(1868) (addressing Supreme Court review of Lincoln’s attempt to suspend habeas 
corpus). 
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counsel undermined the very foundations of human liberty.”231  
The judicial declaration that Native American Indians were 
persons under United States’ law thus responded to the 
question of whether an Indian could prosecute a habeas 
petition.232  
Political commentary through the first half of the 
twentieth century indicates that habeas corpus retained its 
high stature.233  Some commentators personified the writ, 
giving it hero-like qualities.  James Scott and Charles Roe, for 
example, contended that the “great Writ . . . saw the light of 
day and at once grappled with tyranny and oppression.”234  
During this period, the Thomas Mooney case provoked praise 
for habeas review.235  Some commentators even supported 
statutes permitting damages actions against judges who 
wrongly refused to issue the writ.236   
The impact of habeas ideology may have reached its 
zenith with the Supreme Court’s decision to incorporate federal 
criminal procedure rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Unlike the contemporaneous desegregation cases, habeas 
ideology made the Court’s entry into state criminal proceedings 
easier than it would have been if the Court had to create 
entirely new legal doctrine to facilitate the enforcement of 
newly recognized rights.237 
Through the 1960s, the existence of habeas doctrine, 
and the positive ideology accompanying it, made the possibility 
  
 231 ZYLYFF, THE PONCA CHIEFS: AN INDIAN’S ATTEMPT TO APPEAL FROM THE 
TOMAHAWK TO THE COURTS 104 (2d ed., Boston, Lockwood, Brooks & Co. 1880). 
 232 Id. at 126. 
 233 See, e.g., Editorial Paragraphs, 126 THE NATION 393, 395 (1928) (rebuking 
state officials for suggesting that the writ should be ignored); An Inalienable Right, 133 
THE NATION 589, 589 (1931) (describing habeas as “[o]ne of the strongest safeguards 
the American people have in defending themselves against encroachments upon their 
human liberties”). 
 234 JAMES A. SCOTT & CHARLES C. ROE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 3 (1923). 
 235 Editorial Paragraphs, 139 THE NATION 603, 605 (1934) (praising potential 
review on habeas of the conviction of Thomas Mooney, allegedly obtained through 
perjured testimony); Editorial Paragraphs, 140 THE NATION 725, 726 (1935) (praising 
result in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), which ordered California 
Supreme Court to reconsider Mooney’s habeas petition). 
 236 An Inalienable Right, 133 THE NATION 589, 589 (1931) (approving statutes 
providing for damage actions against judges who wrongly refused to issue the writ). 
 237 See Schaefer, supra note 2, at 16-17 (explaining that while state responses 
to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), differed, most states created their own 
systems of collateral review that included scrutiny of federal constitutional violations); 
Thomas Sancton, The Liberal Dilemma, 168 THE NATION 573, 573 (1949) (quoting 
Dean Acheson as rebuking Spain for failing to uphold the writ of habeas corpus, which 
he described as “[t]he fundamental protection against [unlawful confinement] in free 
countries”). 
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of reforming state criminal procedure seem not only possible, 
but at times inevitable.  The idea of habeas corpus as embodied 
in the opinions of Justice Warren in Townsend and Justice 
Brennan in Fay both emboldened the Court to launch the 
criminal procedure revolution and limited the possibilities 
conceivable to state courts and legislatures for resisting.  Those 
seeking to enhance the rights of suspects and the accused 
achieved a triumphant victory.  But it was neither inevitable, 
nor invariable.238 
Even as habeas contracted over the last quarter of the 
century, the high esteem in which the writ was held likely 
delayed and moderated Congressional action to narrow the 
writ’s scope.  For over a decade, conservatives had introduced, 
but were unable to pass, bills that called for the abolition of 
federal habeas review unless a state wholly failed to provide a 
process for litigating the federal claim.239  The 1996 habeas 
reform act was more moderate, requiring not just a review 
process, but also that state courts apply federal law 
reasonably.240 
B. Blunting The Potential Contraction of Criminal 
Procedure Rights 
From the country’s earliest days, there has been what 
might be called a counter-habeas ideology.  This paradigm sees 
habeas corpus as a dangerous device that disrupts otherwise 
well functioning criminal processes.  The framers expressed 
concern with a constitutional habeas clause that might grant 
the federal government too much power.  To be sure, the 
  
 238 For significant periods during which the writ was expansively employed, 
bills were introduced in Congress that would have eliminated or substantially 
narrowed the scope of federal habeas.  Contemporaneously with Brown v. Allen, 344 
U.S. 443 (1953), Congress considered a proposal that would have eliminated federal 
habeas review if a state court provided the defendant an opportunity to raise the 
federal issue in state proceedings.  Schaefer, supra note 2, at 23 (citing H.R. 5649).  In 
the midst of the incorporation era of the 1960s, Congress considered eliminating 
federal habeas entirely.  Paschal, supra note 212, at 606 & n.9 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 
11,186, 11,189 (1968)).  And as federal review of death sentences expanded in the early 
1980s, Congress again considered limiting federal habeas to cases in which the state 
failed to provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim.  See infra note 239. 
For a detailed treatment of proposed habeas reform legislation from the 1940s through 
the early 1990s, see Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 7, at 2344-73. 
 239 See, e.g., S. 1356, 103d Cong. § 705 (1993); S. 2216, 97th Cong. § 2 (1982).  
The debates on these bills invariably contained invocations to the “Great Writ” and the 
need to preserve it.  See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S3447 (1996) (statement of Sen. 
Moynihan). 
 240 See supra Part II.C.8. 
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primary focus was improper federal suspension of state court 
authority to grant the writ.241  But the first Congress’s decision 
to deny federal courts the power to free prisoners in state 
custody confirms some concern with the overuse of the writ as 
well.242 
Seymour Thompson’s 1884 polemic Abuses of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus may constitute the first thoroughly realized 
expression of the counter-habeas ideology.243  He accused the 
federal courts of being “greedy of jurisdiction, just as kings are 
greedy of territory”244 and cautioned that “the police regulations 
of the States, their criminal codes, the decisions of their highest 
judicatories, and even their constitutions, lie at the feet of the 
inferior Federal judges.”245  The late nineteenth century 
political press also summoned the counter-habeas ideology, 
accusing lawyers of using the writ to delay criminal 
processes.246  And the Court’s own early twentieth-century 
rulings interpreting the writ quite narrowly to ensure that 
“every judgment of conviction would [not] be subject to 
collateral attack and review on habeas corpus”247 are cut from 
the same cloth. 
The most prominent articulation of this vision of habeas 
is embodied in Paul Bator’s and Henry Friendly’s influential 
articles arguing that federal habeas should be available only 
where a state fails to provide a corrective process or the 
defendant is innocent of the crime.248  Bator’s attack was 
intellectual, deriding expansive habeas review for undermining 
the educative function of the criminal law, subverting the 
“inner subjective conscientiousness” of the state judiciary, and 
  
 241 FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 12-19. 
 242 Steven Semeraro, Book Review, Reconfirming Habeas History: Reviewing 
Eric M. Freedman’s Habeas Corpus: Rethinking the Great Writ of Liberty, 27 
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 317, 326-27 (2005). 
 243 Thompson, supra note 7, at 20 (“It cannot be doubted that [federal judges] 
have come to regard themselves as entitled to exercise . . . a supervisory authority over 
the State courts, because they have said so.”) (footnote omitted). 
 244 Id. at 5. 
 245 Id. at 22. 
 246 The Week, 52 THE NATION 489, 490 (1891) (arguing that lawyers who use 
the writ to delay criminal cases should be disciplined by the Supreme Court).  See also 
The Week, 566 THE NATION 285, 285 (1876) (criticizing the release on habeas of a 
prisoner who refused to answer the questions of a House committee). 
 247 Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 446 (1925) (explaining that “[i]t is 
fundamental that a court upon which is conferred jurisdiction to try an offense has 
jurisdiction to determine whether or not that offense is charged or proved” and those 
decisions are thus immune from collateral attack in federal court). 
 248 See supra Part I.B. 
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threatening the “psychological necessity in a secure and active 
society” of finality in the criminal law.249  Friendly was blunter, 
arguing that the effort to uncover constitutional violations for 
the benefit of guilty offenders was not worth the cost.250   
By the early 1970s, many expected that the Court would 
cut back significantly on the federal rights it had recognized.  
As Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong wrote in The Brethren, 
“[a]s crime soared, the Court [in expanding criminal procedure 
rights] had brought the country’s wrath upon itself. . . .  The 
nation’s fear of crime had enabled Nixon, who had exploited 
that fear, to be elected President.”251  Judges and commentators 
stridently opposed the continued use of the exclusionary rule,252 
and Justice Black, in a 1971 dissenting opinion, predicted 
backlash against decisions apparently “calculated to make 
many good people believe our Court actually enjoys frustrating 
justice by unnecessarily turning professional criminals loose to 
prey upon society with impunity.”253  The mood of the era was 
expressed well by a Supreme Court clerk: “Mapp is dead.”254 
Ironically, the rhetoric attacking the expansion of the 
exclusionary rule in Mapp,255 Massiah,256 and Miranda,257 never 
produced the reversal of a significant procedural right.  In fact, 
the scope of these decisions continued to expand long after 
  
 249 Bator, supra note 30, at 451-53. 
 250 Friendly, supra note 40, at 146-49. 
 251 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE 
SUPREME COURT 116 (1979); see Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 7, at 2351 (“Nixon’s 
stump speech invariably included the charge that the Court had ‘weaken[ed] the peace 
forces as against the criminal forces’ in America and the promise that he, if elected, 
would strike blows for ‘law and order.’” (quoting Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt 
and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal 
Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 438-39 & n.11 (1980) (quoting Arlen J. Large, “Law 
and Order” – Into the Fuzzy Swirl, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1968, at 20))).  
 252 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496-502 (1976) (Burger, J., 
concurring) (arguing that exclusionary rule should be repealed entirely or limited to 
cases of “egregious, bad-faith conduct”); id. at 538-40 (White, J., dissenting) (stating 
willingness to overturn exclusionary rule in cases when police acted with reasonable 
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Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting); WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 251, at 116; Monrad G. Paulsen, 
The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & 
POLICE SCI. 255, 256 (1961). 
 253 Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 570 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 254 WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 251, at 116. 
 255 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 256 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 257 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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habeas review began to contract,258 and the Court’s use of the 
exclusionary rule has remained quite broad.259  
Anti-habeas ideology may have played a pivotal role in 
forestalling the anticipated assault on constitutional criminal 
procedure.  Three avenues were open to the Nixon 
administration to combat the perceived crime problem.  First, it 
could have engaged in meaningful criminal justice reform.  
Even if Nixon had the will, however, he would likely have been 
unable to identify the means.  Effective crime control measures 
are hard to uncover.  As Stanford Law School Professor 
Lawrence Friedman, a leading legal historian, has explained, 
“the historical records suggest that fluctuations in crime rates 
are largely independent of changes in the criminal justice 
system . . . .  The honest answer . . . is that no one knows why 
crime rates go up and down.”260  
More palatable options were (1) curtailing the rights of 
the accused or (2) restricting the means through which those 
rights are enforced.  The early Nixon administration considered 
both.261  The former would have had a powerful symbolic 
impact.  The latter approach surely seemed less attractive 
because remedial adjustments would be harder to communicate 
to the public at large.  Yet, a Court with four Nixon appointees 
pursued the remedial approach almost exclusively. 
Anti-habeas ideology, expressed by Justice Lewis Powell 
in his crusade against broad habeas review,262 provided a 
  
 258 See supra note 46.  Even the exclusionary rule remained largely intact.  
Although the Court adopted a good faith exception, it applied the limitation only to 
cases in which the police reasonably relied on a warrant or statute authorizing the 
search.  See supra note 47. 
 259 Although the Court did limit the use of the rule for grand jury proceedings, 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974), or to impeach a testifying 
defendant, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1954); see Oregon v. Hass, 420 
U.S. 714, 721-22 (1975) (extending Walder to the exclusion of a defendant’s statements 
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unconstitutionally obtained evidence.  See, e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 309 
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N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1996, at 1. 
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stimulate legislation restraining habeas corpus). 
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Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 391-98 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Rose v. 
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 579 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465, 474-81, 489-96 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224-26 (1973) 
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stalking horse capable of satisfying the demand to change 
something without seriously altering the rights of the 
accused.263  Restraints on habeas, because of its place in the 
American legal consciousness, were both readily apparent and 
likely to be seen as important anti-crime steps despite the 
inconsequential role they play in crime prevention.264   
Justice Powell’s opinions are often read to betray a 
hostility to federal criminal procedure rights that was limited 
to remedy only because of his inability to get the votes to 
overrule those rights.  Just the opposite may have been true.  
Were it not for Powell’s focus on habeas, the Stone case could 
easily have overturned the exclusionary rule.265  And like its 
more overtly liberty-friendly fraternal twin, the counter-habeas 
ideology may thus have played a significant role in maintaining 
the broad criminal procedure rights existing today. 
CONCLUSION 
Habeas corpus doctrine in the United States has taken 
many twists and turns.  To date, the commentators have 
concluded that only the twists – or maybe the turns – make 
sense.  This article presents two theories that help explain 
  
 263 Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 7, at 2351 (“Viewed in historical context, 
then, the campaign to curtail habeas was not fueled primarily by an outcome-neutral 
concern that proper respect be shown to the state courts, nor by concerns about docket 
congestion.  The resistance to federal habeas was a political statement about the 
Warren Court’s alleged tendency to protect the rights of defendants at the expense of 
public safety.”). 
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Chief Justice Burger describing defense lawyers’ seeking federal habeas review as 
“calculated efforts to frustrate valid [death penalty] judgments”) (alteration in 
original); Amy Singer, The Man in Solitary: Who’s Afraid of Habeas Corpus?, 237 THE 
NATION 361, 361 (1983) (“A recent wave of complaints by judges and prosecutors that 
‘jailhouse lawyers’ are clogging the court system with habeas corpus appeals has made 
Federal judges cautious about granting them. . . . [T]he Supreme Court echoed the 
concern about alleged abuse of habeas corpus with its ruling in Barefoot v. Estelle.”);  
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 265 WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 251, at 429-31 (explaining that 
Justice Powell’s decision to cut back on habeas jurisdiction may have blunted the 
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these doctrinal changes.  The judicial-power theory views 
habeas as a means for the United States Supreme Court to 
enforce its authority to proclaim federal constitutional law.  
Each significant step in the development of habeas doctrine 
throughout the twentieth century, many of which have been 
derided as utterly inexplicable, can be explained through 
reasoning that protecting judicial power rather than 
safeguarding individual liberty drove the development of the 
legal doctrine.  This account concludes that the demise of 
broad, systematic, de novo federal habeas review in the 1990s 
should not be interpreted as the end of habeas.  On the 
contrary, those restrictions are part of the normal expansion 
and contraction process.  Ad hoc habeas review that safeguards 
the Supreme Court’s power to proclaim criminal procedural law 
remains alive and well,266 and more expansive review may be 
expected to return with the next significant expansion of 
federal authority. 
Though a useful explanatory tool, the judicial-power 
interpretation of changes in habeas doctrine is incomplete 
because it fails to take account of the doctrine’s influence in 
mediating the contradictory commitments in American society 
to both vigorous anti-crime structures and strong protection for 
individual liberty.  Traditional histories interpret habeas 
doctrine as reactive, changing to take account of evolving 
societal attitudes about crime.  The second theory presented 
here – the conflicting-ideologies theory – contends that habeas 
doctrine did not merely react to changing social forces, it 
helped create the change by enabling those responsible for 
reform to believe it was possible, when of course it was, and 
compelling those opposed to reform to believe it was inevitable, 
even though it was not.  Even during periods dominated by 
opposition to the writ, the doctrine may have helped preserve a 
regime of expansive protection for liberty interests by serving 
as a lightning-rod for criticism and thus absorbing attacks that 
might otherwise have weakened the liberty-enhancing rights 
themselves.  In this way, habeas corpus has indeed made a 
  
 266 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (overturning federal 
appellate court’s refusal to grant a certificate of appeal from the denial of habeas relief 
in state court explaining that “[e]ven in the context of federal habeas, deference does 
not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.  Deference does not by 
definition preclude relief.  A federal court can disagree with a state court’s credibility 
determination and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or 
that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence.”); see Tennard 
v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 288-89 (2004) (reversing denial of certificate of appeal). 
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significant and lasting contribution to the liberty-protecting 
expansion of criminal rights in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. 
